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Abstract. Asymmetric price-setting multi-product suppliers have access to mul-
tiple sources of information about demand conditions, where the publicity of each
source corresponds to the cross-industry correlation of signals received from it. A
signal’s influence on suppliers’ prices is increasing in its publicity as well as in its
precision. The emphasis on relatively public information is stronger for smaller
suppliers who control narrower product portfolios. When information is endoge-
nously acquired, suppliers listen to only a subset of information sources. This
subset is smaller when products are less differentiated and when the industry is
less concentrated. Smaller suppliers focus attention on fewer information sources.
The inefficiencies arising from information acquisition and use are identified. The
associated externalities depend upon the extent of product differentiation, the con-
centration of the industry, and the degree of decreasing returns to scale.
JEL Classification. C72, D43, D83. Keywords. Price competition, uncertainty,
Bayesian equilibrium, information acquisition, public and private information.
This paper studies how asymmetrically sized multi-product suppliers facing uncertain
demand conditions should acquire and use different sources of information.
The context is a price-setting oligopoly in which each supplier controls a portfolio of
horizontally differentiated products. Suppliers learn about industry-wide demand con-
ditions by acquiring and observing signals drawn from a range of information sources.
A source is relatively public if the signals observed by different suppliers are relatively
correlated. Uncertain demand conditions mean that a supplier’s information may be
used to infer the information available to others, and so to form (higher order) beliefs
about competitors’ choices. As a consequence, the publicity of an information source
plays an important role in determining its acquisition and use.
The results describe how the imperfectly competitive suppliers acquire and use infor-
mation about uncertain demand conditions; how acquisition and use respond to charac-
teristics of the industry; and how suppliers’ behaviour affects consumer surplus, total
profits, and social welfare. They show how the relative acquisition and use of different
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2information sources respond to various industry characteristics, and further reveal how
acquisition and use vary across the set of differently sized suppliers.
In a symmetric industry, suppliers use relatively public information more intensively.
This effect is stronger when products are less differentiated and when the industry is
less concentrated. If information is acquired endogenously then suppliers listen to only
a subset of information sources. In an asymmetric industry, in which larger suppliers
control a broader portfolio of product varieties, the pattern of information use depends
upon a supplier’s size. Smaller suppliers use relatively public information more inten-
sively than larger suppliers; they use new information less intensively than their larger
competitors. If information is acquired endogenously then the incentive to acquire new
information is smaller for smaller suppliers. Moreover, smaller suppliers focus their
attention on fewer (relatively public) information sources than do their larger rivals. Fi-
nally, and from a welfare perspective, suppliers make too much use of new information
and place too much emphasis on private information sources.
The interaction of the price-setting oligopolists is equivalent to a coordination game in
which players (suppliers) wish their actions (prices) to be close to a fundamental (de-
mand conditions) and to the actions of others (a price index). Such games have received
much attention following the work of Morris and Shin (2002). However, the typical
model in this literature has (i) a continuum of identical and symmetric players, (ii) just
two information sources (one independent-across-players private signal and one com-
monly observed public signal), and (iii) this information is costless to obtain.
This paper is a first attempt to model asymmetries between the players in such coor-
dination games whilst also generalizing the information structure and acquisition pro-
cess. The oligopoly setting provides a micro-foundation for this coordination game: its
underlying structure endogenously generates asymmetries between the players. These
asymmetries manifest in players whose preferences for coordination differ, whose fun-
damental targets differ, and whose influence on the aggregate (average) action differs.
A model (described in Section 1) is specified in which a set of oligopolists choose prices
for portfolios of differentiated products. Industry characteristics include the extent of
differentiation, the concentration of the industry, and asymmetries in the sizes of sup-
pliers’ product portfolios; these characteristics influence the extent of market power.
Consumers’ utility is quadratic in the profile of products purchased, and so each prod-
uct’s demand is linearly related to prices and a demand shock.
Each supplier acquires and uses a set of informative signals about the demand shock.
Within a normal specification, each information source is characterized by two elements:
its precision as a signal of the demand shock, and the conditional (on the demand shock)
correlation of signal observations seen by different suppliers. A higher correlation coef-
ficient yields an information source that is more public. For example, a perfectly public
signal is perfectly correlated (the same signal is seen by everyone) whereas a perfectly
private information source generates (conditional on the true value of the demand shock)
independent signal realizations for different suppliers. This linear-quadratic-normal
3specification generates an equilibrium (characterized in Section 2) in which prices react
linearly to signal realizations.
A first question (addressed in Section 3) is this: how do prices respond to the different
information sources? In a symmetric industry greater use is made of relatively pub-
lic information: for signals with the same precision, a supplier’s price responds more
strongly to the signal with the higher correlation coefficient. This is because prices are
strategic complements: suppliers wish to correlate their prices with those of their op-
ponents, and do so by placing greater emphasis on relatively public information. This
emphasis is stronger as the industry becomes less concentrated or as product differenti-
ation weakens. Such reductions in market power not only increase the use of relatively
public information, but also reduce the correlation between prices and true underlying
demand conditions.
Asymmetry is captured via differing sizes of the suppliers’ product portfolios. Larger
suppliers have greater influence on the aggregate price index, therefore smaller suppli-
ers will care more about learning the prices of others, and so are more heavily influenced
by higher-order beliefs about demand conditions. This leads to greater intensity in the
use of relatively public information by a small supplier, but less intensive use of new in-
formation overall. Any increase in concentration (in the sense of moving products from
smaller to larger suppliers) induces an overall increase in new information use.
So far the characteristics of the information available to the suppliers have been ex-
ogenously determined. However, if information must be acquired before use, so that
each supplier decides how to allocate attention across the different possible information
sources, then the precision and publicity of each signal will be determined endogenously.
In particular, the more attention is devoted to a particular information source, the more
precise and the more correlated the associated signal will become.
With this observation in mind, a second question (answered in Section 4) is this: how
does the pattern of information acquisition choices vary with the industry’s characteris-
tics? The context is a situation in which each information source is characterized by its
underlying quality (the precision with which the underlying information source identi-
fies the true demand shock) and by its clarity (the strength of the relationship between
the precision of a supplier’s noisy observation of that information source and the atten-
tion devoted to it). In equilibrium, suppliers restrict attention to a subset of information
sources: those that have the highest clarity. That set shrinks (hence focusing attention
on the very clearest information sources, even if they are weaker in underlying quality)
as market power wanes. Moreover, in asymmetric industries the focus on very clear
(and, endogenously very public) signals is strongest for the smallest suppliers. Again,
because smaller suppliers care more for coordination and have less influence on the ag-
gregate price index than do their larger and more price-influential competitors, they
find public information relatively valuable. As a result smaller suppliers focus their
attention on a still smaller set of relatively clear signals.
4A final question (Section 5) follows naturally: is information used efficiently? Of course,
prices are inefficiently high (owing to the market power of the differentiated suppliers)
and indeed the average prices charged in equilibrium equal those (inefficiently high)
prices that would be set in a full-information world. However, a supplier’s choice of how
its price reacts to the signal realizations also involves externalities.
Firstly, competitors benefit most from a rise in another supplier’s price when their own
prices are already high. Hence a supplier exerts a positive externality on competitors
when making more use of relatively correlated signals: the use of relatively public in-
formation is too low from the perspective of the industry’s suppliers. Those suppliers
would also benefit from greater information use overall.
Secondly, and in contrast, consumers prefer prices to be heterogeneous (consumers ex-
ploit bargains amongst different prices) and to react negatively to demand conditions (so
bargains arise when the products are most valuable). These concerns mean that, from
the perspective of consumers, suppliers make too much use of relatively public informa-
tion, and too much use of information overall. Welfare results are also available: when
returns to scale are constant, Marshallian welfare is maximized with relatively greater
use of public information, but ideally would involve no information use at all.
This paper contributes to a literature (described further in Section 6) which has stud-
ied information use in oligopolies (Palfrey, 1985; Vives, 1988) and under supply-function
competition (Vives, 2011, 2013) with uncertain demand conditions. It joins other recent
work (Myatt and Wallace, 2015) in considering the efficiency of information use and ac-
quisition when there are many (differently correlated) information sources. Relative to
Myatt and Wallace (2015), this paper considers a price-setting rather than quantity-
setting environment (so generating the Bertrand versions of Cournot results) and also
extends to admit the analysis of differently sized suppliers. The informational environ-
ment is related to that used in various assessments of the social value of information
(Morris and Shin, 2002; Angeletos and Pavan, 2004, 2007, 2009; Angeletos, Iovino, and
La’O, 2016; Amador and Weill, 2010; Llosa and Venkateswaran, 2013; Colombo, Femmi-
nis, and Pavan, 2014; Amador and Weill, 2012; Myatt and Wallace, 2012, 2014).
The paper makes two key contributions. Firstly, it incorporates asymmetries in player
sizes into a quadratic-payoff coordination game for the first time, hence admitting a
study of the effects of the presence of dominant suppliers (say) or influential players
more broadly. Secondly, it does this by endogenously generating the (asymmetric) coor-
dination game from an underlying price-setting oligopoly model using deep parameters
(such as the extent of product differentiation and industry concentration), thereby pro-
viding a framework for the study of information acquisition and use in such industries.
51. PRICE COMPETITION WITH UNCERTAIN DEMAND
1.1. Demand and Supply. A unit interval of differentiated product varieties is in-
dexed by ` ∈ [0, 1]. A representative consumer’s consumption profile q ∈ R[0,1] yields
gross utility U(q) =
∫ 1
0
u(q`, Q) d` where total consumption is Q =
∫ 1
0
q`′ d`
′ and where
u(q`, Q) = q`
(
θ − βq` + (1− β)Q
2
)
. (1)
β ∈ [0, 1] indexes the degree of product differentiation: the products are completely
undifferentiated if β = 0, but are independent if β = 1.1 The demand shifter θ (which is
uncertain for suppliers) determines the state of demand conditions.2
Facing a profile of prices p ∈ R[0,1], the representative consumer maximizes consumer
surplus U(q)− ∫ 1
0
p`q` d`. Writing P =
∫ 1
0
p` d` for the aggregate price index, solving this
problem yields aggregate demand Q = θ − P and individual demands
q` =
β(θ − p`) + (1− β)(P − p`)
β
. (2)
The set of product varieties is partitioned into M disjoint sub-intervals offered by M
suppliers. The product portfolio Lm ⊆ [0, 1] of supplier m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} has size sm =∫
`∈Lm d`. Asymmetric industry specifications are obtained via different portfolio sizes.
The cost of producing each product variety is quadratic in its output. Any linear term
is (without loss of generality) absorbed into the demand side, and so only the quadratic
term is retained: supplier m’s total manufacturing cost is Cm = c2
∫
`∈Lm q
2
` d`. The param-
eter c indexes the severity of any decreasing returns to scale.
The profit-seeking suppliers simultaneously choose prices. A supplier optimally charges
the same price for every variety within its product portfolio. Write pm for this price and
qm for the corresponding demand (so that p` = pm and q` = qm for all ` ∈ Lm).
1.2. Profits and Consumer Surplus. Using the demand function from (2), the per-
unit profit earned by supplier m and aggregate consumer surplus are
Profitm
sm
= pm
[
θ − pm + (1− β)(P − pm)
β
]
− c
2
[
θ − pm + (1− β)(P − pm)
β
]2
; (3)
Cons. Surplus =
1
2
M∑
m=1
sm
[
(θ − pm)2 + (1− β)(P − pm)(θ − pm)
β
]
. (4)
The profit of a supplier can be re-written to fall within the class of quadratic-payoff
coordination games. There are parameters pim ∈ (0, 1) and γm ∈ (0, 1) such that
Profitm ∝ other terms− pim(pm − γmθ)2 − (1− pim)(pm − P−m)2, (5)
1This linear demand specification has been used by Dixit (1979), Singh and Vives (1984), and many others.
2The specifications of product varieties, consumer demand, and the production technology described here
are identical to those used in the Cournot model of Myatt and Wallace (2015). This model differs by
considering Bertrand (price setting) behaviour and by allowing for asymmetrically sized suppliers.
6where “other terms” do not depend on pm, and where P−m ≡
∑
m′ 6=m sm′pm′/(1 − sm) is
the average price charged by m’s competitors.3 A supplier’s payoff is determined by a
weighted average of two quadratic-loss components. (pm−γmθ)2 is a fundamental motive:
the supplier would like to price close to the target γmθ. (pm − P−m)2 is a coordination
motive, determined by the distance of a supplier’s price from others.
The fundamental target γmθ and the relative importance of the fundamental and co-
ordination motives, measured by pim, both vary with the size sm of the supplier. The
expressions are relatively clean when there are constant returns to scale:
c = 0 ⇒ γm = β
β + (1− (1− β)sm) and pim =
1
2
(
1 +
β
1− (1− β)sm
)
.
Both terms increase in sm: smaller suppliers prefer to set lower prices (γmθ is lower) and
place more emphasis on coordination (pim is lower). These claims also hold for c > 0.
As suppliers become small (increasing M and letting sm → 0), the payoff specification
fits within the scope of Morris and Shin (2002), Angeletos and Pavan (2007), Dewan and
Myatt (2008, 2012), Myatt and Wallace (2012), and others. The key difference here is
the asymmetric setting: the coordination motive (1− pim), the target fundamental (γmθ),
and the influence each supplier has on aggregates (via P ) all vary with supplier size.
1.3. Information. Market conditions are determined by the demand shifter θ. The
suppliers share a common prior θ ∼ N(θ¯, σ2). Supplier m has access to n sources of
information about θ. The signal received from the ith source is
xim = θ + ηi + εim, (7)
where ηi ∼ N(0, κ2i ) and εim ∼ N(0, ξ2im), and where all the noise terms are uncorrelated.4
The common (to all suppliers) shock ηi is noise attributable to the sender of the informa-
tion. The supplier-specific shock εim is observation noise attributable to receiver m.5
This specification induces a correlation structure for the signal observations. Signals
differ in their precision and in their correlation. For instance, if ξ2im = ξ2i for all m (which
is a leading case of interest) then the precision of signal i (as an informative signal of θ)
is ψi = 1/(κ2i + ξ2i ). Conditional on θ, the correlation coefficient between the observations
of two different suppliers is ρi = κ2i /(κ2i +ξ2i ). If observations are more correlated then an
information source is more public; that is, in such instances, it makes sense to associate
the publicity of a signal directly with its correlation coefficient ρi.
3Explicitly, the coefficients γm and pim in this expression are
γm =
β + c(1− (1− β)sm)
β + (1 + c)(1− (1− β)sm) and pim =
β(β + (1 + c)(1− (1− β)sm))
(1− (1− β)sm)(2β + c(1− (1− β)sm)) . (6)
The details of (5)–(6) along with some other calculations may be found in the supplementary Appendix B.
4The information structure is taken from Dewan and Myatt (2008, 2012) and Myatt and Wallace (2012,
2014, 2015). This structure has also been adopted recently by others: see, for example, Pavan (2014).
5Section 4 extends to cases where the variance of εim is endogenously determined. The “sender” and “re-
ceiver” terminology is from Myatt and Wallace (2012), where the information structure is the same, albeit
in a context where the focus is the endogenous acquisition of information in the context of a symmetric
“beauty contest” quadratic-payoff coordination game with a continuum of players.
72. EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION
2.1. Optimal Pricing. The expected profit of supplier m is a concave quadratic func-
tion of the supplier’s price pm. Taking expectations of the expression (3) and differenti-
ating, the first-order condition for a supplier’s price choice yields
pm = pimγm E[θ |xm] + (1− pim) E[P−m |xm], (8)
where the γm and pim are functions of the parameters β, c, and sm from (6), and where
P−m is the (appropriately weighted) average of the prices set by other suppliers.
The solution for pm applies generally. Note that, if others use aggressive pricing strate-
gies and if demand is expected to be weak (for example, when a signal indicates a nega-
tive value for θ) then (8) may yield a negative solution. Relatedly, the pricing choices of
the suppliers may (given the realization of true demand conditions) result in negative
demands from (2). If negative outputs and prices were disallowed then the strategies
considered here would sometimes specify infeasible actions. As noted by Vives (1984,
p. 77, fn. 2), “the probability of such [negative price or quantity events] can be made
arbitrarily small by appropriately choosing the variances of the model.” There are other
resolutions. A fuller discussion, within the context of a Cournot model, was offered by
Myatt and Wallace (2015).6
2.2. The Full-Information Benchmark. If demand conditions (via θ) are known then
equilibrium prices are readily characterized. The optimal price of supplier m satisfies
pm = pimγmθ + (1− pim)P−m. In terms of the average industry price,
pm = δm
[
βθ
1− β + P
]
where δm ≡ (1− β)(β + c(1− (1− β)sm))
β + (β + c)(1− (1− β)sm) . (9)
δm is increasing in sm, and so in the full-information case larger suppliers charge higher
prices: a large supplier internalizes (at least partially) the cannibalizing effect of a price
cut on the demand for substitute products. Taking the weighted sum of pm over all
suppliers and re-arranging yields a solution for the average industry price: this is
P =
βθ
1− β ×
∑M
m=1 smδm
1−∑Mm=1 smδm . (10)
Combining (9) and (10), the equilibrium prices charged are readily obtained.
6As discussed by Myatt and Wallace (2015), this ignore-the-problem approach is not entirely satisfactory.
They documented other resolutions. For example, the normal specification can be dropped. Its advantage
is the linearity of conditional expectations (Li, 1985; Li, McKelvey, and Page, 1987). However, a different
specification with the linear regression property could be used. Another approach is to impose linear-
ity directly by insisting that suppliers choose linear strategies. It is acknowledged that non-negativity
constraints are sometimes important: some have found that results concerning information sharing in
oligopolies (Vives, 1984, for example) can change if non-negativity constraints are respected (Malueg and
Tsutsui, 1998; Lagerlo¨f, 2007). Here, however, the focus is not on information sharing. The shortcut pays
dividends by allowing clear results on the relative use of information sources with different correlations.
8Proposition 1 (Benchmark Case). In the complete-information case, where demand con-
ditions are known to suppliers, the equilibrium price of supplier m is
pm =
βθ
1− β ×
δm
1−∑Mm′=1 sm′δm′ . (11)
Smaller suppliers charge lower prices than their larger competitors. Prices are increasing
in the degree of product differentiation and in the strength of decreasing returns to scale.
The price index P is a convex function of the suppliers’ portfolio sizes. Hence, increasing
the concentration of the industry, by shifting product varieties from a smaller to a larger
supplier, raises the average price charged and lowers aggregate industry output.
2.3. Equilibrium. Strategies are linear if each supplier’s price responds linearly to
signal realizations. For some intercept term p¯m ∈ R and vector of n weights wm ∈ Rn,
such a linear strategy takes the form
pm = p¯m +
n∑
i=1
wim(xim − θ¯).
p¯m is the expected price charged by supplier m, and wim measures the response of the
price charged to the ith signal of demand conditions.
The properties of the normal imply that the regression E[θ |xm] is linear, as is E[xm′ |xm].
Hence, if others use linear strategies then E[P−m |xm] is linear in xm. Applying (8), the
best reply to the linear strategies of others is itself linear in xm.
Given the use of linear strategies, the model reduces to a simultaneous-move game in
which each supplier m chooses p¯m and wm ∈ Rn to maximize expected profit.7
Without fully characterizing equilibrium strategies, the expected prices of suppliers are
easily found. Taking expectations of both sides of (8),
p¯m = pimγm E[E[θ |xm]] + 1− pim
1− sm
∑
m′ 6=m
sm′
[
p¯m′ +
n∑
i=1
wim′ E
[
E[(xim′ − θ¯) |xm]
]]
= pimγmθ¯ +
1− pim
1− sm
∑
m′ 6=m
sm′ p¯m′
⇒ p¯m = δm
[
βθ¯
1− β + P¯
]
where P¯ =
M∑
m′=1
sm′ p¯m′ .
This corresponds to the associated condition from the full-information benchmark case.
It implies that the expected price p¯m charged by supplier m is equal to the price that it
would charge in a full-information world when the demand shifter is known to equal θ¯.
7If the normal specification were discarded, then this game remains amenable to analysis. It is equivalent
to a game in which suppliers are restricted to react linearly to signals of changing demand conditions.
9Proposition 2 (Expected Equilibrium Prices and Outputs). In expectation, suppliers’
prices and outputs equal their full-information counterparts. That is,
p¯m = E[pm] =
βθ¯
1− β ×
δm
1−∑Mm′=1 sm′δm′ . (12)
The properties of the full-information benchmark are inherited: smaller suppliers charge
lower prices on average; the expected average price is increasing in product differentiation
and in the strength of decreasing returns; and increased industry concentration raises the
expected average industry price while lowering expected output.
Hence, the presence of demand uncertainty (or the arrival of a zero-mean demand shock)
has no effect on average. Nevertheless, second moments of prices (and hence outputs)
matter for profits and consumer surplus. As the proof of Lemma 1 will confirm,
E[Profitm]
sm
=
full-information profit
sm
+ other terms (13)
+
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
]
cov[θ, pm]
− 1− (1− β)sm
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
2β
]
var[pm] (14)
+
1− β
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
] ∑
m′ 6=m
sm′ cov[pm, pm′ ]. (15)
The “full information profit” (the profit enjoyed in the absence of any demand shock)
depends only on the expected prices of the various suppliers. The “other terms” are
those that are outside the control of supplier m. They depend on the signal use of other
suppliers, but not on the strategy of supplier m. Moreover, those other terms disappear
completely when the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale (c = 0).
Examining the remaining terms, supplier m gains from co-movement of its price with
the demand shock (via cov[θ, pm]), loses from any volatility in its price (via var[pm]; profit
is concave in price), and gains from co-movement of its price with its competitors (via
cov[pm, pm′ ]; because prices are strategic complements). The first component depends
only on the total reaction of a supplier to new information about demand. To measure
this define w¯m ≡
∑n
i=1 wim for each supplier m. Using this notation,
cov[θ, pm] = w¯mσ
2, var[pm] = w¯
2
mσ
2 +
n∑
i=1
w2im(κ
2
i + ξ
2
im),
and cov[pm, pm′ ] = w¯mw¯m′σ2 +
n∑
i=1
wimwim′κ
2
i . (16)
The relative importance of each (co)variance component depends upon the size of a sup-
plier’s product portfolio. To illustrate the forces at work, consider a special case in which
the quadratic component of suppliers’ costs is eliminated, so that there are constant re-
turns to scale in production, and where suppliers choose the same weights on their
10
signal realizations. cov[pm, pm′ ] is the same for all pairs, so that
E[Profitm]
sm
=
full-information profit
sm
+ other terms
+ cov[θ, pm] +
(1− β)(1− sm) cov[pm, pm′ ]− [1− (1− β)sm] var[pm]
β
.
The value of the alignment of a supplier’s price with demand conditions (via cov[θ, pm])
does not depend on the supplier’s size. However, the importance of price volatility
(var[pm]) relative to price co-movement (cov[pm, pm′ ]) does depend on sm. Specifically, the
ratio of the coefficient on volatility to the coefficient on co-movement is increasing in sm.
This means when comparing the division of influence between two different informa-
tion sources, a larger supplier is primarily concerned with the overall noise in signals,
whereas a smaller supplier cares more about the covariance of signals.
The general expression for supplier profitability is concave in a supplier’s choice of
weights wm ∈ Rn and so first-order conditions determine optimality. Those conditions
generate the following equilibrium characterization. For this, wi =
∑M
m=1 smwim is the
average weight placed on the ith signal realization (where suppliers are weighted by
portfolio sizes) and w¯ =
∑n
i=1 wi is the average influence of new information on prices.
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium Characterization). The equilibrium weights satisfy[
κ2i + (1− δmsm)ξ2im
]
wim − δmwiκ2i = σ2
[
δm
(
β
1− β + w¯
)
− w¯m
]
. (17)
The first-order condition (17) holds for all information sources and all suppliers. It gen-
erates a linear system of nM equations in the nM weights. This system is readily solved
using linear algebraic methods. The solution can be found for any parameter constella-
tion, and (for various cases) explicit solutions are reported in later propositions.
For now, however, notice that the coefficient attached to wim is κ2i + (1− δmsm)ξ2im. Hence,
the importance of the idiosyncratic noise associated with an information source relative
to the common noise depends upon the breadth of a supplier’s product portfolio.
3. INFORMATION USE
Lemma 1 provides, at least implicitly, a general characterization of the equilibrium
weights. To investigate further the properties of these weights it is convenient to focus
on three leading cases of interest. Firstly, a general information structure is analysed
when suppliers have equally sized product portfolios. The objective is to explore the rel-
ative use of different kinds of information (relatively private versus relatively public).
Secondly, and maintaining the general information structure, this case is extended to
admit the presence of a monopolistically competitive fringe of suppliers. This enables
a comparison of the information used by suppliers in the fringe and that used by their
larger competitors. Finally, a fully general industry structure (where each supplier has
11
a differently sized portfolio) is studied when a single new information source is avail-
able. The aim here is to understand how the reaction of prices to new information varies
with the size of suppliers.
3.1. Symmetric Industries. A first insight into information use is obtained in a sym-
metric industry: s ≡ sm = 1/M and ξ2im = ξ2i for all m. Applying Proposition 2,
p¯m =
βθ¯
1− β ×
δ
1− δ = γθ¯ ∀m, (18)
where the subscripts from δm and γm have been dropped. The solutions to (17) are
symmetric across suppliers. The equilibrium is obtained by solving the n equations[
(1− δ)κ2i + (1− δs)ξ2i
σ2
]
wi =
δβ
1− β − (1− δ)w¯. (19)
Recall that ψi and ρi are the precision and correlation coefficient of signal i.
Proposition 3 (Symmetric Equilibrium). If suppliers are symmetric, then the unique
linear equilibrium satisfies pm = p¯m +
∑n
i=1wi(xim − θ¯), where
wi ∝ 1
piκ2i + ξ
2
i
=
ψi
1− (1− pi)ρi and where pi =
1− δ
1− sδ . (20)
Fixing the correlation coefficients, relatively precise signals have relatively greater influ-
ence. Fixing the precisions, relatively correlated signals have relatively greater influence.
The total influence of new information on the prices set by suppliers is
w¯ =
γϕ
1 + ϕ
, where ϕ ≡
n∑
i=1
piσ2
piκ2i + ξ
2
i
. (21)
This is increasing in both the precisions and the correlations of suppliers’ signals.
The industry makes relatively greater use of relatively public information. Consider the
ratio of the weights placed on two different informative signals:
wi
wj
=
ψi
ψj
1− (1− pi)ρj
1− (1− pi)ρi .
This is increasing in ρi and decreasing in ρj. The relative use of information also de-
pends upon the characteristics of the industry. Specifically, note that if ρi > ρj (the ith
information source is more public than the jth) then the ratio above is decreasing in pi.
The parameter pi represents a supplier’s concern with a fundamental motive (to track
demand conditions) relative to a coordination motive (to follow the prices charged by
competitors). In terms of the industry’s characteristics,
pi =
1− δ
1− sδ =
β(β + (1 + c)(1− (1− β)s))
(1− (1− β)s)(2β + c(1− (1− β)s)) where s =
1
M
.
This is increasing in β and s. Greater product differentiation (a rise in β) and an in-
creased share of product varieties (equivalently, a fall in M ) give a supplier more market
power, and so that supplier focuses more on the fundamental motive.
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Proposition 4 (Comparative Statics). The equilibrium weight placed on a more pub-
lic signal relative to a more private signal is decreasing in product differentiation, but
increasing in the number of competitors and the strength of decreasing returns to scale.
Formally: if ρi > ρj then the ratio wi/wj is decreasing in β but increasing in M and c.
Proposition 4 reveals how the characteristics of the industry determine the use of differ-
ent kinds of information. Those characteristics also determine the reaction of prices to
shifts in the demand shock. An increase in market power raises prices or, equivalently,
induces stronger reactions to perceived improvements in demand conditions. This effect
is present in the movement of the baseline expected price in response to changes in ex-
pected conditions: recall that p¯m = γθ¯ from (18). Industry characteristics also influence
information use, and this in turn changes how prices respond to new information. One
way to measure the response to shocks relative to the level of a supplier’s price is the
Relative Impact of New Information ≡ ∂pm/∂θ
∂p¯m/∂θ¯
=
ϕ
1 + ϕ
,
where ϕ is defined in (21) and is increasing in pi. Factors that raise the suppliers’ focus on
the fundamental objective (such as greater product differentiation or increased industry
concentration) result in a greater (relative) impact of new information on prices.
This property is a reflection of the implicit use by suppliers of the prior mean θ¯ as a
perfectly public signal of demand conditions. That is,
ρi = 1 ⇒ ∂pm/∂θ¯
∂pm/∂xim
=
κ2i
σ2
.
Hence an increase in the relative impact of new information (following a change that
results in an increase in pi) is a consequence of the fact that new information is relatively
private compared to the (common, and so perfectly public) prior.
The relationship between market conditions and prices can also be evaluated via the
correlation coefficient between a supplier’s price and the demand shifter θ. Note that
corr[pm, θ] =
cov[θ, pm]√
σ2 var[pm]
=
w¯σ2√
σ2 var[pm]
=
[
1 +
n∑
i=1
(wi
w¯
)2 κ2i + ξ2i
σ2
]− 1
2
,
where the final equality follows from the substitution of the expression for var[pm].
Straightforward but tedious derivations confirm that this expression is increasing in
pi. Hence, if suppliers become more concerned with the fundamental objective then (as
expected) their prices correlate more strongly with any shock to demand.
Proposition 5 (Industry Characteristics and Price Responses). The relative impact of
new information on prices and the correlation between prices and the underlying demand
conditions are (i) increasing in product differentiation, β, (ii) increasing in the concen-
tration of the industry, s, and (iii) decreasing in the strength of decreasing returns, c.
The results of Propositions 3–5 are readily compared to those obtained in a Cournot in-
dustry. The analysis of Myatt and Wallace (2015) shows that quantity-setting suppliers
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choose outputs that respond to signals with coefficients wi ∝ 1/(piκ2i + ξ2i ). However, in a
Cournot world pi > 1, which implies that suppliers place greater emphasis on private in-
formation. The key comparative-static results are also reversed. Proposition 2 of Myatt
and Wallace (2015) shows that an increase in product differentiation or reduction in the
number of competitors (equivalently, an increase in the share of varieties controlled by
each supplier) results in a shift in emphasis away from relatively private signals. Here
(Proposition 4) it results in a shift toward relatively private signals.
Corollary. In a price-setting industry, the relative use of new and more private informa-
tion strengthens as the market power of suppliers rises via heightened product differenti-
ation and industry concentration. In a Cournot industry, the opposite claims hold.
Quantities are strategic substitutes whereas prices are strategic complements. Cournot
suppliers dislike co-movement of their outputs, and so shy away from relatively public
information. In contrast, price-setting suppliers gain from co-movement of their prices
and so place more emphasis on highly correlated signals.
A key message from the symmetric analysis is a comparative static claim: there is
greater use of public information as suppliers become smaller. However, given only a sin-
gle cross-sectional observation of an industry, it would be interesting to know whether
the same claim applies. Necessarily this involves the study of an asymmetric industry.
Moreover, comparative static exercises conducted in a symmetric setting unavoidably
conflate two issues. As the sizes of the suppliers change, information use (and acquisi-
tion) changes for two reasons. The supplier’s objective function is affected through an
“own-size” effect but also by the size of their competitors. To disentangle these effects,
attention now turns to asymmetric industries, in which the sizes of the product port-
folios differ between different suppliers. Two issues are investigated: the relationship
between supplier size and the relative importance of the different kinds (more or less
public) of information; and the impact of the industry’s concentration on the reaction of
prices to new information about changing demand conditions.
3.2. A Monopolistically Competitive Fringe. Consider an industry structure com-
prising an oligopoly of M leading suppliers with equal shares of the product space, and a
monopolistically competitive fringe of suppliers with negligibly sized product portfolios.
This is a limiting case of an industry structure in which there are two different types
(sizes) of supplier, and where the width of the smaller portfolio is allowed to shrink. This
specification, via the introduction of negligibly sized suppliers who have no influence on
their larger competitors, usefully isolates the own-size effect mentioned just above.
The pricing strategies of the monopolistically competitive fringe have a negligible effect
on the average industry-wide use of each information source, and so wi is (for each
signal) fixed from the perspective of fringe members. For the symmetric oligopolists,
the use of information satisfies wim = wi, the solution to which is characterized in (20) of
Proposition 3. For any fringe supplier (identified with the subscript F throughout) note
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that sF = 0 and so (17) in Lemma 1 reduces to[
κ2i + ξ
2
iF
]
wiF − δFwiκ2i = σ2
[
δF
(
β
1− β + w¯
)
− w¯F
]
. (22)
Continuing with the case ξ2iF = ξ2i for all i, the solution to these equations along with the
characterization of wi in Proposition 3 combine to give the following result.
Proposition 6 (Information Use in the Competitive Fringe). The monopolistically com-
petitive fringe uses relatively public information relatively intensively. That is,
wiF
wjF
>
wi
wj
⇔ ρi > ρj. (23)
Smaller suppliers care more about the coordination motive and less about the funda-
mental motive than do their larger competitors (pim is increasing in sm). More highly
correlated (public) information is therefore relatively useful for them. In contrast, larger
suppliers have greater influence on the aggregate price index and so care less about oth-
ers’ prices. This reduces the emphasis they place on relatively public information.
3.3. The Use of New Information. Propositions 3 and 5 offer results on the use of
new information in the context of a symmetric industry. Straightforwardly, such in-
formation use increases as that information becomes more precise and as the demand
shock itself becomes more uncertain. More subtly, the total influence of new information
is also increasing in the publicity of each information source. Turning to industry char-
acteristics, the relative impact (and, indeed, the absolute impact) of new information on
prices is increasing in the concentration of the industry.
Here, attention turns to an asymmetric industry where suppliers offer differently sized
portfolios of product varieties. To focus on the characterization of information use, how-
ever, a situation is considered in which there is only a single source of new information.8
Specifically, n = 1 and so the subscript i can be dropped. Equivalently: wim = w¯m and
wi = w¯. An equilibrium is characterized by M first-order conditions of the form[
κ2 + (1− δmsm)ξ2m
]
w¯m − δmw¯κ2 = σ2
[
δm
(
β
1− β + w¯
)
− w¯m
]
. (24)
These equations describe the way in which new information influences prices.
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium with a Single Signal). In an asymmetric industry where suppli-
ers have access to a single information source, the use of new information satisfies
w¯m ∝ δm
σ2 + κ2 + (1− δmsm)ξ2m
≡ µm. (25)
The influence of new information on the average price is
w¯ =
βσ2
1− β ×
∑M
m=1 smµm
1− (σ2 + κ2)∑Mm=1 smµm . (26)
8A second source of purely public information can be accommodated by absorbing it into the prior.
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Inspecting the solution for w¯m, and recalling that δm is an increasing function of sm (and
hence so is µm), larger suppliers place greater absolute weight on new information rel-
ative to smaller suppliers. However, and as noted previously, larger suppliers charge
higher prices on average owing to their greater market power. Hence, a more appropri-
ate measure of the use of new information in relative terms is the
Relative Impact of New Information ≡ ∂pm/∂θ
∂p¯m/∂θ¯
∝ 1
σ2 + κ2 + (1− δmsm)ξ2m
.
This is increasing in sm: larger suppliers use new information more intensively. Not-
ing that new information is always relatively private compared with a common prior,
the intuition is precisely as before: larger suppliers influence the aggregate price index
more and are therefore less concerned with the coordination motive (and consequently
relatively correlated information) than are their smaller competitors.
The influence of new information on the average price charged can also be evaluated.
The solution for w¯ is a convex function of the suppliers’ product-portfolio, and so in-
creases when products are shifted from a smaller supplier to a larger competitor.
Proposition 7 (The Use of New Information). Larger suppliers use new information
more intensively than smaller suppliers. The total use of new information is increasing
in industry concentration, as is the average price.
The weakening of market power associated with increased concentration lessens the
industry’s reliance on public information. The common prior over demand conditions
(equivalently, the state of demand θ¯ before any shock) acts as a purely public signal:
new information is relatively private. Reduced market power lowers the importance of
coordination, so raising the emphasis placed on new (relatively private) information and
thereby increasing the average price charged by the suppliers.
Summary. In the context of a symmetric price-setting industry, information use ex-
hibits a bias towards relatively public signals. This bias is more pronounced and the
co-movement of prices with demand conditions is weaker when suppliers have less mar-
ket power. These results are the mirror images of those obtained in the Cournot indus-
try of Myatt and Wallace (2015). In an asymmetric price-setting industry, information
use differs between suppliers of different sizes. Smaller suppliers (specifically, those
in a competitive fringe) exhibit a relatively stronger bias toward relatively public in-
formation sources when compared to their larger competitors. Within a more general
industrial structure, larger suppliers use new information more intensively. Moreover,
an increase in concentration increases the overall use of new information.9
9These latter results do not have analogues in the quantity-setting Cournot industry of Myatt and Wallace
(2015), simply because that earlier paper restricts to a symmetric specification.
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4. INFORMATION ACQUISITION
In this section, the model is extended to allow suppliers to acquire information endoge-
nously. The approach follows that of Myatt and Wallace (2012) which is developed below
to admit the asymmetries present in the price-setting oligopoly framework.
The characteristics of the suppliers’ signals have so far been fixed. The variance κ2i
measures sender noise, interpreted as a common error in observing θ made by the in-
formation provider, and, as such, is exogenous from the perspective of the suppliers.
Receiver noise, on the other hand, measured by ξ2im, is arguably endogenous. This is
noise associated with how much attention supplier m pays to an information source. In-
creased attention raises the precision with which the signal is observed, and so reduces
receiver noise. To capture this idea, let
εim ∼ N
(
0,
ξ2i
zim
)
,
where zim ≥ 0 is the (private) attention paid by supplier m to information source i.
zim = 0 is interpreted as m paying no attention to source i: in such a case m will receive
a completely uninformative (infinite variance) signal from source i. It is important to
note that the attention decision (choice of zim) is made prior to the pricing decision, but
that this choice is not observed by a supplier’s competitors.
Note that zim is proportional to the precision of the signal which supplier m receives
about θ + ηi. Within a standard sampling procedure, the precision of a signal is propor-
tional to the sample size. Hence, zim can be interpreted as the expenditure on a sample
size used to generate a signal from the ith information source, or as the time spent
watching that source. Similarly, 1/ξ2i can be interpreted as the clarity of that sampling
procedure. Source i is clearer than j if ξi < ξj, and a supplier m devotes more attention
to i than j if zim > zjm. Setting zim = 0 is equivalent to ignoring a signal altogether.
Suppose that suppliers have a limited stock of attention, so that
∑n
i=1 zim ≤ 1 for all m.
The idea is that suppliers must choose how to allocate their limited attention (or sam-
pling capacity) between the various information sources.10 An alternative specification
would be to assign an (increasing) cost to acquisition. The qualitative features of many
of the results below would be unaffected at the cost of some algebraic complexity. In
particular, convexity of such a cost function would leave the results largely intact.11
4.1. Symmetric Industries. To identify the optimal acquisition policy zm ∈ Rn+ for
supplier m, note that expected per-unit profit given in (13)-(15) depends on ξ2im = ξ2i /zim
10Indeed, see Han and Sangiorgi (2015) for a possible micro-foundation of this specification.
11Myatt and Wallace (2012, 2015) analyse the case of a convex increasing cost function for information
acquisition, the latter paper does so in a (symmetric) Cournot context. The approach taken there could
be applied straightforwardly to the current symmetric price-setting industry; given the focus here on
asymmetric industries, the stock-of-attention interpretation is retained for expositional convenience.
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only through the variance term var[pm] of (14). Using (16) this term is
var[pm] = w¯
2
mσ
2 +
n∑
i=1
w2im
(
κ2i +
ξ2i
zim
)
,
and it enters negatively into the expected profit expression. Given the (endogenously
chosen) weights placed on the various signal realizations, supplier m chooses zm ∈ Rn+
to minimize this variance subject to the attention-span constraint
∑n
i=1 zim ≤ 1.
The incentive to give attention to the ith information source is proportional to the weight
placed on the signal received from that source: the solution satisfies zim ∝ ξiwim. Hence,
in the context of a symmetric equilibrium (with symmetric suppliers) the influence of
and the attention paid to the ith information source jointly satisfy
wi ∝ 1
piκ2i + ξ
2
i /zi
and zi ∝ ξiwi.
If a signal has no influence (wi = 0) then it receives no attention (zi = 0). Focusing on the
set of signals that do receive attention (and so exert influence) the two equations above
can be combined. Doing so, there is some constant K (to be determined below) such that
the attention paid to the ith information source (if it is used) satisfies
zi =
ξi(K − ξi)
piκ2i
.
Fixing the clarity of a signal i, attention is inversely proportional to the sender noise
(the variance κ2i ) or, equivalently, is proportional to the underlying quality of the infor-
mation source. However, attention is non-monotonic in the clarity of the information
source. This is a general property that does not depend upon any functional-form as-
sumptions. This is because when ξ2i is small the signal is easy to understand (relatively
little attention is needed to comprehend what the sender is trying to say) and so the
optimal zi can be low. Likewise, if ξ2i is sufficiently large then the information source is
too expensive, and is ignored: the solution reported above only holds if ξi < K, if ξ2i is too
large, then the solution does not apply and zi = wi = 0 in equilibrium. Hence attention
is maximized for intermediate levels of clarity.
This analysis suggests that only the clearest information sources (where ξi is sufficiently
small) are candidates to receive attention and so to exert influence. The proof of Proposi-
tion 8 goes further by establishing that if an information source receives attention then
any clearer information source does so too. Briefly: if an information source i currently
receives no attention at all, then a supplier can raise its expected profits by increasing
the attention it pays (zim) up from zero while reducing zjm for some j with ξ2j > ξ2i .
Proposition 8 describes equilibrium information acquisition in a symmetric industry
(the m notation is dropped as in Section 3.1). It translates analogous results in Dewan
and Myatt (2008) and Myatt and Wallace (2012) to the price-setting oligopoly context.
Proposition 8 (Equilibrium Information Acquisition). Label the information sources in
order of decreasing clarity: ξ1 < · · · < ξn. In a symmetric industry, where sm = 1/M for
all m, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. In that equilibrium:
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(i) an information source influences prices if and only if it is acquired: wi > 0⇔ zi > 0;
(ii) it is acquired if and only if it is sufficiently clear: zi > 0⇔ ξi < K for some K;
(iii) the attention paid to an acquired information source satisfies
zi = max
{
ξi(K − ξi)
piκ2i
, 0
}
where K = min
i∈{1,...,n}
{
pi +
∑i
j=1 ξ
2
j /κ
2
j∑i
j=1 ξj/κ
2
j
}
; (27)
(iv) the number of information sources that receive attention falls as the market power of
suppliers weakens, via either reduced product differentiation or increased competition,
or with a strengthening of any decreasing returns to scale;
(v) amongst those information sources that receive attention, the clearest are endoge-
nously the most public: ρi > ρj if and only if ξi < ξj; and
(vi) a fall in market power (via, for example, reduced product differentiation or market
entry) shifts attention toward clearer (and more public) information sources.
The key to the fourth claim (and others) is that K is increasing in pi. Anything that
increases the fundamental motive will result in a higher value for K, and as a result
(weakly) more information sources will be acquired. Turning this around, the stronger
the coordination motive, the smaller (and clearer) is the set of signals acquired by the
suppliers. This means that industries operating under relatively competitive conditions
(low differentiation, large number of suppliers) acquire a relatively small number of
the very clearest signals. Coordination is paramount in such industries, and these are
precisely the information sources most useful for that exercise.
4.2. A Monopolistically Competitive Fringe. When there is a symmetric set of M
oligopolists and a monopolistically competitive fringe, as in Section 3.2, more can be said
about the mix of information that the differently sized suppliers acquire.
For the M oligopolists, the solution reported in Proposition 8 applies: they focus atten-
tion on the clearest information sources. Note also that a reduction in concentration
(fewer competitors) emphasizes the focus on those clearest sources.
Each member of the competitive fringe also seeks to minimize its price variance subject
to the attention-span constraint, and so ziF ∝ ξiwiF . Also, the weights placed on the
various signals satisfy the first-order conditions of (22). Combining these, the attention
paid by fringe members to the ith information source (if it is used) takes the form
ziF =
ξi(KiF − ξi)
κ2i
. (28)
The key difference is that whilst K in (27) does not depend directly upon i, KiF in (28)
does. In particular it depends linearly upon wiκ2i ∝ K − ξi. This induces a greater bias
(relative to the case where KiF is constant with respect to i) toward clearer information
sources. The next proposition confirms this formally.
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Proposition 9 (Acquisition and a Competitive Fringe). If the M symmetric oligopolists
and the suppliers in the monopolistically competitive fringe acquire the same set of sig-
nals, then the fringe acquire (and use) more intensively information which is relatively
clear, equivalently, this is information which is relatively public within the oligopoly.
ziF
zjF
>
zi
zj
⇔ wiF
wjF
>
wi
wj
⇔ ξ2i < ξ2j ⇔ ρi > ρj.
Otherwise, suppliers in the competitive fringe acquire a strict subset (consisting of the
most clear) of those signals acquired by the M symmetric oligopolists.
A message of Proposition 8 is that the members of a symmetric industry shift attention
(and influence) toward clearer (and, endogenously, more public) information sources as
the size of each supplier falls. Fixing the industry configuration, Proposition 9 reports a
related result from looking across the set of suppliers: a fringe supplier focuses more on
clearer information sources than do its larger oligopolist competitors. The driving force
here is the one that is common to many results of the paper: smaller suppliers recognize
that their competitors have a greater influence over the aggregate price and so care
relatively more about coordination. This shifts their information use (and so acquisition)
towards information that is (now endogenously) more public: so much so, indeed, that
sufficiently private information acquired by their competitors may be ignored altogether.
4.3. The Acquisition of New Information. Returning to the specification of Section
3.3, with n = 1 and M arbitrarily sized suppliers, suppliers’ information acquisition
solutions are simple: they choose zm = 1 for all m (the subscript i has been dropped).
The derivative of expected profit with respect to zm reveals the value of new information:
∂ E[Profitm]
∂zm
∣∣∣∣
zm=1
= sm × 1− (1− β)sm
β
×
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
2β
]
× w¯2mξ2.
The very first term (sm) simply reflects directly the size of the supplier in question. The
second and third terms constitute the (negative) weight that price variance is given in
per-unit profit: this is decreasing in sm as larger suppliers care less about own-price
variability. Finally w¯2m affects the own-price variance var[pm] positively. Given that, from
Lemma 2, w¯m is increasing in sm (because larger suppliers pay more attention to new
information), sm has conflicting effects on the incentive to acquire new information.
Using the equilibrium value of w¯m ∝ µm from (25), the objective is to check whether
F (sm) =
sm(1− (1− β)sm)
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
2β
](
δm
σ2 + κ2 + (1− δmsm)ξ2
)2
(29)
is increasing or decreasing in sm. Some straightforward algebra confirms that, so long
as c is not too large, if sm > sm′ then F (sm) > F (sm′). The next proposition summarizes.
Proposition 10 (Acquiring New Information). For c sufficiently small, larger suppliers
have a greater incentive to acquire new information than smaller suppliers.
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Recall that Proposition 7 reports that larger suppliers make greater use of new informa-
tion. Those suppliers (as confirmed in Proposition 10) also have a heightened incentive
to acquire information. This incentive is present because they make less use of very
public information. As noted earlier, the prior is a kind of perfectly public signal, and so
less reliance on it implies greater use (and so acquisition) of new information.
Summary. In a symmetric industry, Section 3.1 reports a bias towards relatively public
signals that is more pronounced as market power weakens. If information is acquired
endogenously, then the publicity of a signal is determined in equilibrium. The key find-
ing here is that information acquisition exhibits a bias towards clear sources (where lit-
tle attention is needed to understand what a sender says) which become (endogenously)
the most public. Similarly, Section 3.2 reports that smaller suppliers (fringe members)
exhibit a relatively stronger bias toward relatively public information. Here, that mes-
sage carries across to the acquisition of information from relatively clearer sources.
5. THE EXTERNALITIES OF INFORMATION USE AND ACQUISITION
Attention now turns to welfare considerations: what impact do suppliers’ information
choices have upon consumer surplus, industry profits, and social welfare? Myatt and
Wallace (2015) answer these questions in the context of a fully micro-founded Cournot
model. Here the questions are posed in a price-setting industry. Given that prices are
strategic complements and quantities strategic substitutes, it is natural to conjecture
that many results will be reversed. This turns out indeed to be the case. Primarily for
reasons of expositional simplicity and to facilitate a direct comparison between the price
and quantity setting worlds, this section restricts to a symmetric specification.
5.1. Profits, Consumer Surplus, and Welfare. Putting aside the use of new infor-
mation, the core equilibrium price (that is, the intercept p¯m from a supplier’s pricing
rule) is too low from the perspective of the industry’s suppliers, and too high from the
perspective of consumers. The reasons for this are entirely standard. Here, then, the
average price charged by supplier is fixed at its equilibrium level and the focus turns to
the externalities involved in a supplier’s use of informative signals.
For now, the quadratic component of each supplier’s cost is eliminated, so that c = 0. For
this constant-marginal-cost case, the concern for the fundamental motive is
pi =
1
2
[
1 +
β
1− (1− β)s
]
.
If c = 0 then the “other terms” of the profit expression (13) disappear. Any externalities
from signal use come from the M − 1 terms in the final line (15) which depend positively
on the covariance of a supplier’s price with the prices of others. This covariance is in-
creasing in the weight that a competitor places on informative signals. Hence, a supplier
(and so the industry) would benefit if all suppliers used their information more inten-
sively. Moreover, a supplier is also affected when a competitor shifts weight between
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one signal and another. Note that
∂ cov[pm, pm′ ]
∂wim′
− ∂ cov[pm, pm′ ]
∂wjm′
∝ κ
2
i
piκ2i + ξ
2
i
− κ
2
j
piκ2j + ξ
2
j
> 0 ⇔ ρi > ρj.
Hence, from an industry profit perspective, suppliers make too little use of their infor-
mation sources, and place insufficient emphasis on relatively public information.
The optimal collusive use of information is readily characterized. The proof of Proposi-
tion 11 confirms that in a symmetric industry with the play of symmetric strategies,
E[Industry Profit] = full-information profit + cov[θ, pm]− var[pm]
pi†
+
(1− pi†) cov[pm, pm′ ]
pi†
where pi† ≡ β
1− (1− β)s. (30)
pi† is the strength of the fundamental motive relative to the coordination motive desired
by a collusive regime. Substituting in for the variance and covariances,
E[Industry Profit] = full-information profit + (w¯ − w¯2)σ2 − 1
pi†
n∑
i=1
w2i
(
pi†κ2i + ξ
2
i
)
.
pi† < pi and so (from a profit perspective) non-cooperative suppliers insufficiently empha-
size coordination. Prices are strategic complements, and so a supplier would prefer to
use a higher price when competitors are also offering high prices. The desire to correlate
prices results in a collusive desire for public information sources.
In a symmetric industry,
E[Consumer Surplus] = other terms− cov[θ, pm] + var[pm]
2pi†
− (1− pi
†) cov[pm, pm′ ]
2pi†
.
The coefficients on the variance and covariance terms are opposite in sign to those on
both individual and industry-wide profit. Consumers prefer prices to be negatively cor-
related with the state of demand. That is, they prefer to take advantage of low prices
when the products are more valuable. The positive coefficient on the variance stems
from the usual property that consumers benefit from price variation. For the same rea-
son, positive covariance of different suppliers’ prices is undesirable, since it prevents
consumers from taking advantage of relative price differences between varieties.
A welfare perspective is obtained by summing industry profit and consumer surplus
to obtain the usual Marshallian welfare measure. Industry profit increases one-for-
one with the covariance of demand conditions and supplier prices (that is, cov[θ, pm]),
whereas consumer surplus decreases one-for-one with the same term. These two cancel
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out when welfare is considered: correlation of prices with demand conditions is irrele-
vant from a welfare perspective. Thus, information use only matters because it influ-
ences the variance and covariance of suppliers’ prices. In fact,
E[Welfare] = full-information welfare +
σ2
2
− var[pm]
2pi†
+
(1− pi†) cov[pm, pm′ ]
2pi†
= other terms− w¯
2σ2
2
− 1
2pi†
n∑
i=1
w2i
(
pi†κ2i + ξ
2
i
)
,
and so welfare is maximized by removing the link between prices and signals.
Proposition 11 summarizes the various externalities associated with information use,
and also characterizes both the collusive and socially optimal weights.
Proposition 11 (The Externalities of Information Use). Consider the equilibrium of a
symmetric industry in which there are constant returns to scale in production.
The effects on industry profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare of (i) a local increase
in the use of any signal i, and (ii) a local shift in use away from a relatively private signal
j and towards a relatively public signal i, where ρi > ρj, are
Profit Surplus Welfare
(i) an increase in any wi + − −
(ii) a shift from wj to wi with ρi > ρj + − +
The information use that collusively maximizes expected profit satisfies
w†i ∝
1
pi†κ2i + ξ
2
i
and w¯† =
ϕ†
2(1 + ϕ†)
where ϕ† =
n∑
i=1
pi†σ2
pi†κ2i + ξ
2
i
,
and where pi† is defined in (30) and satisfies pi† < pi.
Fixing a level of information use w¯, a social planner also prefers to set wi ∝ 1/(pi†κ2i + ξ2i ).
However, it is socially optimal to ignore new information and set wi = 0 for all i.
In summary, suppliers would prefer to see greater information use and greater relative
use made of relatively public information; consumers would prefer to see less informa-
tion use and greater relative use made of relatively private information. Despite the
bias towards relatively public signals, social welfare would increase with a rise in this
bias (as would industry profit); whereas welfare would decrease with a rise in the use of
new information (as would consumer surplus).
A message is that the use of any information about changing demand conditions is so-
cially undesirable. In a Cournot world, there is a good (welfare) reason for tracking
demand conditions: when demand is strong (a rise in θ) it is optimal to produce more,
and so outputs should (ideally) react positively to signals of demand.12 Here, however,
production automatically tracks demand conditions because (fixing prices) consumers
choose to buy more as θ rises. Linking demand to prices offsets this (useful) effect.
12The Cournot analysis of Myatt and Wallace (2015) confirms that new information is socially useful.
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5.2. Decreasing Returns to Scale. The analysis above restricts to industries in which
the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale, so that c = 0.
If there are decreasing returns, so that c > 0, then the “other terms” from the profit
expression for supplier m become relevant. These other terms are independent of m’s
choice of pricing strategy, but do depend on the information use of others.
For the purposes of compact exposition, it is useful to focus on an industry with monop-
olistically competitive suppliers so that M →∞ and so s→ 0. In this case,
other terms = −cσ
2
2
− c(1− β)
β
(
(1− β) cov[pm′ , pm′′ ]
2β
+ cov[θ, pm′ ]
)
.
These negative terms all carry the coefficient c. This is because they are all determined
by the variation in supplier m’s output. If c > 0 then such variation is costly for a
supplier, owing to the convexity of the cost function in output. If competitors make
greater use of their information, then their prices move together. This increases the
variability of the demand faced by supplier m.
The terms are all increasing in the weight placed on any signal. It follows that the pres-
ence of decreasing returns to scale reinforces a social planner’s preference to eliminate
the use of new information. Furthermore, those other terms are independent of the
receiver noise in each information source. Hence, the incorporation of such terms into
either an industry profit or welfare objective provides a rationale for a shift away from
relatively high sender noise (and so relatively public) information sources.
Nevertheless, once the presence of decreasing returns is incorporated,
E[Industry Profit] = full-information profit− cσ
2
2
+ [1 + c] w¯σ2
− (2 + c)w¯
2σ2
2
− 2 + c
2pi‡
n∑
i=1
w2i (pi
‡κ2i + ξ
2
i ) where pi
‡ =
(2 + c)β2
2β + c
;
it is straightforward to check that pi‡ < pi, and so (from an industry perspective) suppliers
continue to place too little emphasis on the coordination motive.
Note that the coefficient on the term w¯σ2 is 1 + c > 1. When this is combined with the
corresponding term in consumer surplus, cw¯σ2 remains. This means there is a local gain
to the initial use of new information (the remaining terms of welfare are second order
around wi = 0) which means that the socially optimal level of information use is positive.
Proposition 12 (Externalities with Decreasing Returns). If c > 0 then the socially op-
timal use of new information is positive. Moreover, from both an industry and welfare
perspective, there is too little emphasis on relatively public information sources.
5.3. Welfare and Information Acquisition. In an industry with constant returns to
scale, there are externalities associated with information use (Proposition 11): suppliers
would prefer greater information use and greater relative use made of relatively public
information, whereas consumers would prefer less information use and greater relative
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use of relatively private information. Overall, given constant returns, there is no social
value from conditioning prices on demand conditions and so welfare is maximized when
all signals are ignored. With decreasing returns, however, it is valuable to reduce the
variation in suppliers’ demands and so new information is useful (Proposition 12).
If information is acquired endogenously, then (very naturally) under constant returns
there is no social value to the acquisition of information; after all, there is no socially
beneficial use for it. However, there can be externalities from the information acquisi-
tion decisions while fixing the extent to which informative signals are used.
Fix for now the weights placed on signal realizations in an industry. Reducing the in-
formation acquired generates noisier prices, which naturally benefits consumers: they
may use price variation to exploit relative bargains, which is of course reflected in the
usual property that consumer surplus is a convex function of prices.
Greater noise in a supplier’s price increases the variance of the demand for competitors’
products. If there are constant returns then competitors’ profits are linear in such de-
mands and so linear in the price of a supplier. Thus, adding noise does not influence the
expected profits of competitors. From an industry perspective, then, there are no exter-
nalities from information acquisition. However, if there are decreasing returns (c > 0)
then competitors’ profits are concave in their demands and so concave in a supplier’s
price: a supplier exerts a negative externality on competitors by reducing information
acquisition. In this case, the industry’s suppliers would (fixing information use) prefer
to see more information acquisition, whereas the consumers would rather see less.
6. RELATED LITERATURE
This paper relates to studies of information use in quadratic-payoff coordination games,
with a focus on how oligopolists’ strategies depend upon their available information.
Morris and Shin (2002) prompted others to study information use in quadratic-payoff
coordination games where payoffs depend upon the distance of actions from some fun-
damental and from the average action of others. In a world with public (perfectly
correlated) and private (conditionally uncorrelated) signals about the fundamental, ac-
tions react more strongly to public information: such information is more important for
higher-order beliefs. Frameworks like this have been applied extensively: to investment
games, to business cycles, to large oligopoly games, to monopolistically competitive sup-
pliers, to political leadership, to financial markets, and to networked communication
(Angeletos and Pavan, 2004, 2007; Hellwig, 2005; Dewan and Myatt, 2008, 2012; Allen,
Morris, and Shin, 2006; Calvo´-Armengol and de Martı´, 2007, 2009; Calvo´-Armengol,
de Martı´, and Prat, 2015; Currarini and Feri, 2015; Fainmesser and Galeotti, 2016).
This paper joins others that allow for multiple information sources and for endogenous
information acquisition. The information structure was introduced (in a model of po-
litical leadership) by Dewan and Myatt (2008, 2012), was extended (within a “beauty
contest” setting) and applied (to Lucas-Phelps island and Cournot oligopoly models) by
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Myatt and Wallace (2012, 2014, 2015). Partial correlation of observations (a central fea-
ture) has also been incorporated into the work of Angeletos and Pavan (2009), Baeriswyl
(2011), and Baeriswyl and Cornand (2007, 2011). Endogenous signal acquisition was
also studied by Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), while the recent models of Colombo, Fem-
minis, and Pavan (2014), Llosa and Venkateswaran (2013), and Pavan (2014) also allow
players to choose the precision of a private signal. There are other, also recent, papers
in which a public signal emerges endogenously as a noisy aggregate of players’ actions
(Angeletos, Lorenzoni, and Pavan, 2012; Bayona, 2015).
This paper determines, in the context of a micro-founded differentiated-product price-
setting oligopoly, the properties and (in)efficiency of information use and acquisition in a
framework which admits a general correlation structure. The use and acquisition of dif-
ferent kinds (more public or more private) of information depend on the players’ relative
concerns for fundamental and coordination motives. Here, the desire to coordinate is
determined endogenously by market characteristics such as product differentiation and
the industry’s concentration. Moreover, micro-founding the model in this way admits a
more meaningful welfare analysis.
A more notable contribution is to allow for asymmetric players. Here, larger players
care relatively little about coordination, target a higher fundamental, and exert greater
influence on the aggregate action; these differences between larger and smaller players
are derived from differently sized product portfolios. The specification allows results
about the relative use of information (small suppliers emphasize more public informa-
tion), the use of new information (larger suppliers and more concentrated industries use
new information more intensively), and relative information acquisition (small suppli-
ers acquire information from fewer sources).
This paper also relates more distantly to work that has examined the incentives of
oligopolists to share information. In a Cournot industry, information sharing about
common demand conditions hurts industry profits (Novshek and Sonnenschein, 1982;
Clarke, 1983; Vives, 1984, 1990; Li, 1985; Gal-Or, 1985). However, sharing information
about private costs or supplier-specific demand components helps Cournot suppliers to
reduce the (undesirable, from a supplier’s perspective) correlation between their output
choices (Fried, 1984; Li, 1985; Gal-Or, 1986; Shapiro, 1986). These results are reversed
in price-setting models (Vives, 1984; Gal-Or, 1986). For a unification of this, and other
work (including Sakai, 1986; Kirby, 1988; Sakai and Yamato, 1989), see Raith (1996).
This paper also relates to work that has investigated the efficiency of industries with
dispersed private information about demand conditions (Palfrey, 1985; Vives, 1988; Li,
McKelvey, and Page, 1987). For example, Vives (1988) used a Cournot model and noted
that (private) information is acquired and used efficiently in the competitive limit. The
present paper differs by considering a differentiated-product model, by using a price-
setting game, by allowing access to multiple signals with different correlation struc-
tures, and by offering results away from the monopolistically competitive limit. Notably,
the information structure allows results on the inefficient balance of information use
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across relatively public and private sources. Others (Hwang, 1993, 1995; Hauk and
Hurkens, 2001; Vives, 2002) have developed the Vives (1988) model in several direc-
tions, while more recent papers (Vives, 2011, 2013) model supply-function competition.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The relationship between player-level asymmetries and information acquisition and
use explored here has not received much attention in the aforementioned literature.
Nonetheless, several of the applications described above may warrant such an explo-
ration: industries have dominant suppliers; political parties and financial markets have
big players; and networks have influential agents.
In each case it might be expected that the actions of larger players would have greater
impact on aggregates, whereas smaller players would have less influence. The intuition
that this leads smaller players to seek relatively public information in order to improve
the accuracy of their higher-order beliefs should apply equally to these applications.
The three consequences of asymmetries in the price-setting model described here (larger
suppliers influence aggregate prices more; their target fundamental is higher; and their
coordination motive lower) may play out in subtly different ways in different applica-
tions. However, the intuition that smaller players are relatively biased towards coordi-
nation and hence have preferences for relatively public information ought to be robust.
APPENDIX A. OMITTED PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1. Separating out various components,
Profitm
sm
=
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
]
θpm
− 1− (1− β)sm
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
2β
]
p2m
− cθ
2
2
− c(1− β)
2(1− sm)2
2β2
P 2−m
+
(1− β)(1− sm)
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
]
P−mpm
− c(1− β)(1− sm)
β
θP−m.
This is concave in pm. Taking the first-order condition:
∂
∂pm
[
Profitm
sm
]
=
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
]
θ
− 1− (1− β)sm
β
[
2 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
]
pm
+
(1− β)(1− sm)
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
]
P−m = 0.
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Note that (1− sm)P−m =
∑
m′ 6=m sm′pm′ . Adding and subtracting the mth term:[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
]
θ =
1− (1− β)sm
β
[
2 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
]
pm
+
1− β
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
]
smpm − 1− β
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
]
P
=
1
β
[
2− (1− β)sm + c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
]
pm − 1− β
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
]
P.
This solves to give pm in terms of the average price P :
pm =
(1− β)(β + c(1− (1− β)sm))
β + (β + c)(1− (1− β)sm)
[
βθ
1− β + P
]
= δm
[
βθ
1− β + P
]
,
where δm is as defined in the text. This is increasing in sm. Hence, looking across the set of
industry participants, larger suppliers set higher prices.
Multiplying this by sm and summing over all suppliers yields an equation in P which solves to
yield (10). Substituting back in gives the final solution for pm reported in (11).
For the final claim, differentiating twice confirms that smδm is a convex function of sm, and hence∑M
m=1 smδm is (as the sum of convex functions) convex in the sizes of the suppliers. P is a convex
function of this summation, and so is convex. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Follows from arguments in the text. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Using the expression from the proof of Proposition 1,
E[Profitm]
sm
=
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
]
E[θpm]
− 1− (1− β)sm
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
2β
]
E[p2m]
− cE[θ
2]
2
− c(1− β)
2
2β2
∑
m′ 6=m
∑
m′′ 6=m
sm′sm′′ E[pm′pm′′ ]
+
1− β
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
] ∑
m′ 6=m
sm′ E[pmpm′ ]
− c(1− β)
β
∑
m′ 6=m
sm′ E[θpm′ ].
The various moments satisfy E[θ2] = θ¯2 + var[θ], E[p2m] = p¯2m + var[pm], and so on. Substitution
leads to the claimed expression prior to the statement of the lemma.
cov[θ, pm], var[pm], and cov[pm, pm′ ] are obtained straightforwardly. Differentiating,
∂ cov[θ, pm]
∂wim
= σ2,
∂ var[pm]
∂wim
= 2w¯mσ
2 + 2wim(κ
2
i + ξ
2
im),
and
∂ cov[pm, pm′ ]
∂wim
= w¯m′σ
2 + wim′κ
2
i .
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Hence the first-order condition for wim is
0 =
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
]
σ2
− 1− (1− β)sm
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
2β
]
[2w¯mσ
2 + 2wim(κ
2
i + ξ
2
im)]
+
1− β
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
] ∑
m′ 6=m
sm′ [w¯m′σ
2 + wim′κ
2
i ].
Re-arranging by adding and subtracting the mth term to the summation, collecting terms, and
simplifying, this condition becomes
0 = σ2
[
β
1− β + w¯ −
β + (β + c)(1− (1− β)sm)
(1− β)[β + c(1− (1− β)sm)] w¯m
]
−
[
β + (β + c)(1− (1− β)sm)
(1− β)[β + c(1− (1− β)sm)] − sm
]
[wimξ
2
im]
− β + (β + c)(1− (1− β)sm)
(1− β)[β + c(1− (1− β)sm)]wimκ
2
i
+ wiκ
2
i .
The large fraction appearing three times in this equation is equal to 1/δm. Hence:
1
δm
wimκ
2
i +
[
1
δm
− sm
]
wimξ
2
im − wiκ2i = σ2
[
β
1− β + w¯ −
w¯m
δm
]
,
which (on multiplying through) yields the condition reported in the lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Given the definition of pi, the first-order condition of (19) is
wi =
σ2/(1− δs)
piκ2i + ξ
2
i
[
δβ
1− β − (1− δ)w¯
]
,
which yields the claim regarding the proportionality of wi. Summing over i,
w¯ ≡
n∑
i=1
wi =
σ2
1− δs
[
δβ
1− β − (1− δ)w¯
] n∑
i=1
1
piκ2i + ξ
2
i
,
which is straightforwardly re-arranged to yield the statement of w¯ in the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Follows from arguments in the text. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Follows from arguments in the text. 
Proof of Proposition 6. The first-order condition for a fringe member is[
κ2i + ξ
2
i
]
wiF = δFwiκ
2
i + σ
2
[
δF
(
β
1− β + w¯
)
− w¯F
]
.
Fix two information sources where ρi > ρj , and take the ratio of their FOCs:
wiF
wjF
=
[
κ2j + ξ
2
j
]
[
κ2i + ξ
2
i
] wiκ2i + σ2
[(
β
1−β + w¯
)
− w¯FδF
]
wjκ2j + σ
2
[(
β
1−β + w¯
)
− w¯FδF
] .
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Suppose that supplier m is a member of the competitive fringe, so that wim = wiF and sm = 0.
The use of signal i relative to j is stronger in comparison to the industry if[
κ2j + ξ
2
j
]
[
κ2i + ξ
2
i
] wiκ2i + σ2
[(
β
1−β + w¯
)
− w¯FδF
]
wjκ2j + σ
2
[(
β
1−β + w¯
)
− w¯FδF
] > wi
wj
.
Noting that wi ∝ ψi/[1− (1− pi)ρi] where ρi = 1/(κ2i + ξ2i ), this is equivalently
wiκ
2
i + σ
2
[(
β
1−β + w¯
)
− w¯FδF
]
wjκ2j + σ
2
[(
β
1−β + w¯
)
− w¯FδF
] > 1− (1− pi)ρj
1− (1− pi)ρi .
Multiplying up by the denominators on both sides (an inspection of the first-order conditions
confirms that the denominator of the left-hand side is positive, and so the direction of inequality
is maintained) and re-arranging, the required inequality is
[1− (1− pi)ρi]wiκ2i − [1− (1− pi)ρj ]wjκ2j > (1− pi)(ρi − ρj)σ2
[(
β
1− β + w¯
)
− w¯F
δF
]
.
From Proposition 3, the solution for wi is
wi =
piσ2w¯
ϕ(piκ2i + ξ
2
i )
=
piσ2w¯
ϕ(κ2i + ξ
2
i )(1− (1− pi)ρi)
where ϕ =
n∑
j=1
piσ2
piκ2j + ξ
2
j
. (31)
Substituting in, the required inequality becomes
piσ2w¯(ρi − ρj)
ϕ
> (1− pi)(ρi − ρj)σ2
[(
β
1− β + w¯
)
− w¯F
δF
]
.
Given that ρi > ρj , cancel terms on both sides to obtain
piw¯
ϕ
> (1− pi)
[(
β
1− β + w¯
)
− w¯F
δF
]
.
To verify this inequality, return to the first-order condition for a fringe member:
wiF =
δFwiκ
2
i
κ2i + ξ
2
i
+ σ2
[
δF
(
β
1− β + w¯
)
− w¯F
]
1
κ2i + ξ
2
i
.
Sum this over the n information sources
w¯F
δF
=
∑n
i=1wiρi +
(
β
1−β + w¯
)
σ2
∑n
i=1 ψi
1 + σ2
∑n
i=1 ψi
.
Substitute this back in to the required inequality, to obtain
piw¯
ϕ
[
1 + σ2
n∑
i=1
ψi
]
> (1− pi)
[(
β
1− β + w¯
)
−
n∑
i=1
wiρi
]
.
Straightforward but tedious re-arrangement shows that this is equivalent to
piw¯
(
1 + ϕ
ϕ
)
>
β(1− pi)
1− β .
Next recall that
w¯ =
ϕ
1 + ϕ
δβ
(1− β)(1− δ) .
Substitution leads to the inequality 1− δ < pi, which holds since pi = (1− δ)/(1− sδ). 
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Proof of Lemma 2. The first-order condition (24) is equivalently[
σ2 + κ2 + (1− δmsm)ξ2m
]
w¯m = δm
[
βσ2
1− β + w¯(σ
2 + κ2)
]
,
which immediately yields (25). Solving for w¯m and summing over m,
w¯ =
M∑
m=1
smw¯m =
[
βσ2
1− β + w¯(σ
2 + κ2)
] M∑
m=1
δmsm
σ2 + κ2 + (1− δmsm)ξ2m
,
which solves straightforwardly to yield (26). 
Proof of Proposition 7. The first claim (larger suppliers use new information more intensively)
follows from the arguments in the text. The claims regarding the industry’s concentration follows
because (for example) w¯ is a convex function of the supplier’s sizes. By inspection, w¯ is an
increasing and convex function
∑M
m=1 smµm. Hence it is sufficient to show that each element of
this summation is convex (since the sum of convex functions is itself convex). Now note that
smµm =
δmsm
σ2 + κ2 + (1− δmsm)ξ2m
is (again by inspection) an increasing convex function of δmsm. It has already been noted (in the
proof of Proposition 1) that δmsm is a convex function of sm. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Recall that the expected profit of m satisfies
E[Profitm]
sm
= other terms +
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
]
cov[θ, pm]
− 1− (1− β)sm
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
2β
]
var[pm]
+
1− β
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)sm)
β
] ∑
m′ 6=m
sm′ cov[pm, pm′ ]
where the “other terms” include the full-information profit (if θ = θ¯) which depends only on the
expected prices of the suppliers, and other terms that are outside the control of supplier m.
The covariance terms cov[θ, pm] = w¯mσ2 and cov[pm, pm′ ] = w¯mw¯m′σ2 +
∑n
i=1wimwim′κ
2
i are linear
(and hence concave) in m’s choice of weights. The variance term is
var[pm] = w¯
2
mσ
2 +
n∑
i=1
w2im
(
κ2i +
ξ2i
zim
)
.
The ith element of the summation is convex in wim and zim, and hence var[pm] (as the sum
of convex functions) is convex in m’s choices. It follows that m’s profit is concave, and so any
interior solution to the expected profit maximization is characterized by first-order conditions.
Consider a symmetric equilibrium, and write N ⊆ {1, . . . , n} for the set of information sources
that receive attention and are used (so that wi = 0 and so zi = 0 for i /∈ N ). For these (used)
information sources, the minimization of var[pm] implies zi ∝ ξiwi. The influence wi of the ith
signal satisfies the solution (20) from Proposition 3. Hence:
zi ∝ ξiwi ∝ ξi
piκ2i + ξ
2
i /zi
⇒ zi = ξi(K − ξi)
piκ2i
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for some constant K. Summing over i ∈ N yields∑i∈N zi = 1, which upon re-arrangement yields
K ≡ pi +
∑
j∈N ξ
2
j /κ
2
j∑
j∈N ξj/κ
2
j
.
Note that this is a solution only if zi > 0, which requires ξi < K. Equivalently, if ξi > K (which
is true for all higher indices) then an information source must be ignored.
The next step is to show that N comprises the clearest information sources. To do this, first note
that the optimal choice of attention implies
zim =
ξiwim∑n
j=1 ξjwjm
⇒ var[pm] = w¯2mσ2 +
n∑
i=1
w2im
(
κ2i +
ξi
∑n
j=1 ξjwjm
wim
)
.
Using this expression, m’s expected profit is determined solely by the weights placed on the
various signals. Differentiating with respect to the weight placed on the ith signal,
∂ var[pm]
∂wim
= 2w¯mσ
2 + 2wimκ
2
i + 2ξi
n∑
j=1
ξjwjm.
Hence, evaluated at a symmetric strategy profile in a symmetric industry,
∂
∂wim
[
E[Profitm]
s
]
− ∂
∂w(i+1)m
[
E[Profitm]
s
]
=
− 1− (1− β)s
β
[
2 +
c(1− (1− β)s)
β
]wiκ2i − wi+1κ2i+1 + (ξi − ξi+1) n∑
j=1
ξjwj

+
1− β
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)s)
β
]
(1− s)[wiκ2i − wi+1κ2i+1]
>
(
(1− β)(1− s)
β
+
[
2 +
c(1− (1− β)s)
β
])
(wi+1κ
2
i+1 − wiκ2i )
where the strict inequality is obtained by eliminating the term involving ξi+1 − ξi. Now suppose
that information source i+ 1 is used (wi+1 > 0) but source i is not (wi = 0). Then
∂
∂wim
[
E[Profitm]
s
]
− ∂
∂w(i+1)m
[
E[Profitm]
s
]
>(
(1− β)(1− s)
β
+
[
2 +
c(1− (1− β)s)
β
])
wi+1κ
2
i+1 > 0.
In other words, a supplier would strictly benefit by shifting attention and influence toward the
ith information source. Hence, if an information source has influence, then any clearer source
also has influence. Equivalently, there is some i such that N = {1, . . . , i}.
Evaluated at a symmetric profile where wi = 0,
∂
∂wim
[
E[Profitm]
s
]
=
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)s)
β
]
σ2 − 1− (1− β)s
β
[
2 +
c(1− (1− β)s)
β
]
ξi
n∑
j=1
ξjwj
−
(
(1− β)(1− s)
β
+
[
2 +
c(1− (1− β)s)
β
])
w¯σ2.
Hence, there is an incentive to introduce the use of the ith signal if
ξi <
β∑n
j=1 ξjwj
[β + c(1− (1− β)s)]σ2 − [β + (1 + c)(1− (1− β)s)] w¯σ2
[2β + c(1− (1− β)s)][1− (1− β)s] . (32)
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Simplifying this expression by using the definitions of pi and γ, this is equivalent to
ξi <
σ2pi[γ − w¯]∑n
j=1 ξjwj
.
From earlier calculations (and inserting ξ2im = ξ
2
i /zi as appropriate), w¯ = γϕ/(1 + ϕ) ⇒ γ − w¯ =
γ/(1 + ϕ) = w¯/ϕ. Note wi = σ2piw¯/ϕ(piκ2i + ξ
2
i /zi) from (31). Substituting the solutions for
zi found above into the wi terms in
∑n
j=1 ξjwj and rearranging, the inequality in (32) becomes
ξi < K. This confirms the equilibrium takes the declared form where K = Ki for some i and
Ki ≡
pi +
∑i
j=1 ξ
2
j /κ
2
j∑i
j=1 ξj/κ
2
j
,
which satisfies ξi ≤ Ki < ξi+1. There is a unique Ki which satisfies this. Specifically, Lemma 4 of
Dewan and Myatt (2008) establishes that the corresponding i also minimizes Ki.
The arguments so far establish claims (i) to (iii). For the comparative static claim of (iv) note
that an increase in pi (which is determined by β, M , and c) increases Ki for all i and so increases
K, which raises the number of information sources that receive attention.
For claim (v), note that
ρi > ρj ⇔ κ
2
i
ξ2i /zi
>
κ2j
ξ2j /zj
⇔ K − ξi
piξi
>
K − ξj
piξj
⇔ ξi < ξj .
Finally, to establish claim (vi), for ξi < ξj note that
zi
zj
=
ξiκ
2
j
ξjκ2i
× K − ξi
K − ξj ,
which is decreasing in K and hence decreasing in pi. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Write N = {i | zi > 0} and NF = {i | ziF > 0} and let N = NF . Define
k0 =
∑
i∈N
1
κ2i
, k1 =
∑
i∈N
ξi
κ2i
, and k2 =
∑
i∈N
ξ2i
κ2i
. (33)
zi is found in Proposition 8, and given these definitions, for i ∈ N , may be written
zi =
ξi
piκ2i
{
pi + k2
k1
− ξi
}
.
The first-order condition for the M symmetric oligopolists may be written
wi =
νzi
ξi
=
ν
piκ2i
{
pi + k2
k1
− ξi
}
⇒ w¯ = ν
pi
{
(pi + k2)k0 − k21
k1
}
(34)
for some constant ν. Returning to the first-order condition for wi in (17) for the symmetric case,
inserting ξ2im = ξ
2
i /zi = νξi/wi, for those signals in use (i ∈ N ),
(1− δ)wiκ2i + (1− sδ)νξi = σ2
[
δ
β
1− β − (1− δ)w¯
]
⇒ wi + ν
pi
ξi
κ2i
=
σ2
κ2i
[
δ
1− δ
β
1− β − w¯
]
⇒ w¯ + ν
pi
k1 = σ
2k0(γ − w¯)
⇒ w¯(1 + σ2k0) + ν
pi
k1 = γσ
2k0.
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Now, inserting the equation for w¯ in (34) into this expression gives
ν
pi
{
(pi + k2)k0 − k21
k1
}
+
ν
pi
k1
1 + σ2k0
= γ
σ2k0
1 + σ2k0
⇒ ν = γpik1
(pi + k2)(σ−2 + k0)− k21
. (35)
Note that this final expression for ν is explicit. Substituting back in to earlier expressions for w¯
and wi provides a complete solution to the symmetric oligopoly information-acquisition problem.
Now consider the first-order equations for the competitive fringe. Recall that N = NF , so the
same set of signals have positive use for both the oligopoly and the fringe. The first-order condi-
tion in ziF may be written, for some constant νF ,
wiF ξi
ziF
= νF ⇒ ξ2iF ≡
ξ2i
ziF
= νF
ξi
wiF
.
Substituting in this expression for ξ2iF in (22), and dividing by κ
2
i , gives, for all i ∈ N ,
wiF + νF
ξi
κ2i
− δFwi = σ
2
κ2i
[
δF
β
1− β − (w¯F − δF w¯)
]
. (36)
Summing over i ∈ N (and here is where it is important that N = NF ),
w¯F − δF w¯ + νFk1 = σ2k0
[
δF
β
1− β − (w¯F − δF w¯)
]
.
An explicit form for νF is required for the later calculations. To obtain this, first solve for w¯F−δF w¯
in the above expression:
w¯F − δF w¯ = δF
{
σ2k0
1 + σ2k0
β
1− β −
νF
δF
k1
1 + σ2k0
}
⇒ σ2
[
δF
β
1− β − (w¯F − δF w¯)
]
=
σ2
1 + σ2k0
[
δF
β
1− β + k1νF
]
. (37)
Returning now to the rewritten first-order condition in (36), pre-multiply by ξi, then sum over
i ∈ N (again, note the importance of N = NF for this step),
νF + k2νF − δF ν = σ2k1
[
δF
β
1− β − (w¯F − δF w¯)
]
=
σ2k1
1 + σ2k0
[
δF
β
1− β + k1νF
]
,
since by definition
∑
i∈N ξiwi = ν and
∑
i∈NF ξiwiF = νF . Now this provides an expression for νF
in terms of ν, for which an explicit solution has been provided in (35): it is convenient to write[
(1 + k2)(σ
−2 + k0)− k21
] νF
δF
=
β
1− βk1 + (σ
−2 + k0)ν. (38)
Returning once again to the rewritten first-order condition in (36), and using the form of the
right-hand side given in (37),
wiF = δF
{
wi +
1
κ2i
[
1
σ−2 + k0
β
1− β +
(
k1
σ−2 + k0
− ξi
)
νF
δF
]}
.
The objective is to compare the ratio wiF /wjF with wi/wj . Suppose, as in the statement of the
proposition that ξ2i < ξ
2
j or ξi < ξj , then
wiF
wjF
>
wi
wj
⇔
wi +
1
κ2i
[
1
σ−2+k0
β
1−β +
(
k1
σ−2+k0 − ξi
)
νF
δF
]
wj +
1
κ2j
[
1
σ−2+k0
β
1−β +
(
k1
σ−2+k0 − ξj
)
νF
δF
] > wi
wj
.
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Now cross-multiplying and cancelling the wiwj terms, this is true if and only if
1
σ−2+k0
β
1−β +
(
k1
σ−2+k0 − ξi
)
νF
δF
1
σ−2+k0
β
1−β +
(
k1
σ−2+k0 − ξj
)
νF
δF
>
κ2iwi
κ2jwj
=
pi + k2 − ξik1
pi + k2 − ξjk1 ,
where the final equality follows from the value of wi stated in (34). Multiplying across, cancelling
common terms, and collecting together what remains gives
wiF
wjF
>
wi
wj
⇔ (ξj − ξi)(pi + k2)νF
δF
> (ξj − ξi)k1 1
σ−2 + k0
[
β
1− β + k1
νF
δF
]
⇔ (pi + k2)(σ−2 + k0)νF
δF
> k1
[
β
1− β + k1
νF
δF
]
⇔ [(pi + k2)(σ−2 + k0)− k21]νFδF > k1 β1− β
⇔ νF
δF
>
β
1− β
[
k1
(pi + k2)(σ−2 + k0)− k21
]
⇔ β
1− βk1 + (σ
−2 + k0)ν >
β
1− βk1
[
(1 + k2)(σ
−2 + k0)− k21
(pi + k2)(σ−2 + k0)− k21
]
,
where this last step follows from substituting with (38). Continuing:
wiF
wjF
>
wi
wj
⇔ (σ−2 + k0)ν > β
1− βk1
[
(1 + k2)(σ
−2 + k0)− k21
(pi + k2)(σ−2 + k0)− k21
− 1
]
⇔ (σ−2 + k0)ν > β
1− βk1
[
(1− pi)(σ−2 + k0)
(pi + k2)(σ−2 + k0)− k21
]
⇔ ν > β
1− β
[
(1− pi)k1
(pi + k2)(σ−2 + k0)− k21
]
⇔ γpik1
(pi + k2)(σ−2 + k0)− k21
>
β
1− β
[
(1− pi)k1
(pi + k2)(σ−2 + k0)− k21
]
,
from the explicit form of ν given in (35). Cancelling terms, finally,
wiF
wjF
>
wi
wj
⇔ γpi > β
1− β (1− pi). (39)
Finally, recalling that γ = β/(1−β)×δ/(1−δ) and pi = (1−δ)/(1−sδ), and so 1−pi = δ(1−s)/(1−sδ),
the inequality reduces to 1 > 1− s, which of course is true. Thus, as required,
wiF
wjF
>
wi
wj
⇔ ξi < ξj .
Moreover, using the proportionality between (i) ξiwi and zi and (ii) ξiwiF and ziF ,
wiF
wjF
>
wi
wj
⇔ ziF
zjF
>
zi
zj
.
The oligopoly’s optimal information acquisition policy ensures that ξi < ξj ⇔ ρi > ρj (as argued
after Proposition 8). This observation completes the proof of the first part of Proposition 9.
The second part of the proposition states two things. First: the competitive fringe also places
positive weight only on a set comprising the clearest signals. Second: if the fringe does not use
the same set of signals as the oligopoly then it uses strictly fewer.
For the first fact it will be shown that for two signals with ξ2j > ξ
2
i (equivalently j > i if the
sources are ordered in terms of clarity), if the fringe uses j it must also use i: zjF > 0⇒ ziF > 0.
For the second fact, it is then sufficient to show that any unused signal i by the oligopoly is also
unused by the fringe: zi = 0⇒ ziF = 0.
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First Fact. Consider two signals with ξ2j > ξ2i . Suppose supplier m places weights wjm and wim
on these two signals respectively. The first step is to calculate the sign of the change in expected
profits experienced by m if the supplier raised wim and lowered wjm by the same amount (so
keeping w¯m fixed). To do this, recall the expression for expected profits in (13)-(15). Using the
expressions for var[pm] and cov[pm, pm′ ] in (16), and evaluating at a symmetric equilibrium (so
that cov[pm, pm′ ] is the same for all m′ 6= m),
E[Profitm] ∝ other terms + cov[pm, pm′ ]− χm var[pm]
= other terms +
n∑
i=1
[
wimwim′κ
2
i − χmw2im(κ2i + ξ2im)
]
,
where χm =
(1− (1− β)sm)(2β + c(1− (1− β)sm))
2(1− β)(1− sm)(β + c(1− (1− β)sm)) =
1
2(1− pim) ,
and the “other terms” depend on the weights only through w¯m. Now consider the optimal infor-
mation acquisition decision of supplier m. This satisfies:
zim ∝ wimξi ⇒ zim = wimξi∑n
j=1wjmξj
⇒ ξ2im =
ξ2i
zim
=
ξi
∑n
j=1wjmξj
wim
.
Hence:
E[Profitm] ∝ other terms +
n∑
i=1
[
wimwim′κ
2
i − χm
(
w2imκ
2
i + wimξi
n∑
j=1
wjmξj
)]
.
Information acquisition terms are eliminated, and so m chooses only weights. Next, differenti-
ating with respect to wim gives
∂ E[Profitm]
∂wim
∝ ∂[other terms]
∂wim
+ wim′κ
2
i − 2χm
(
wimκ
2
i + ξi
n∑
j=1
wjmξj
)
,
where the derivative of “other terms” is the same for all i, since the effect of a change in wim is
felt only via w¯m. This means that, for i 6= j,
∂ E[Profitm]
∂wim
− ∂ E[Profitm]
∂wjm
∝ wim′κ2i − wjm′κ2j − 2χm
(
wimκ
2
i − wjmκ2j + (ξi − ξj)
n∑
k=1
wkmξk
)
.
Now consider a symmetric oligopoly with a competitive fringe. Here, wim′ = wi: the symmetric
equilibrium weight placed on the ith signal. Moreover, χF = (2β + c)/2(1− β)(β + c). Hence:
∂ E[ProfitF ]
∂wiF
− ∂ E[ProfitF ]
∂wjF
∝ [wiκ
2
i − wjκ2j ]
2χF
+ wjFκ
2
j − wiFκ2i + (ξj − ξi)
n∑
k=1
wkmξk.
Since ξ2j > ξ
2
i the oligopoly either acquires both signals, neither, or just i (from Proposition 8). If
both are acquired by the oligopoly then, using the equilibrium values of zi and zj from (27) and
the first-order condition ξiwi = νzi for all i, wiκ2i > wjκ
2
j . Else, j is not acquired, and wiκ
2
i ≥ wjκ2j
since wj = 0. Given that ξj − ξi > 0, this means that, for some positive constant A,
∂ E[ProfitF ]
∂wiF
− ∂ E[ProfitF ]
∂wjF
> A(wjFκ
2
j − wiFκ2i ).
Now suppose that wjF > 0 but wiF = 0. Hence supplier m is free to simultaneously raise wiF and
lower wjF . However
∂ E[ProfitF ]
∂wiF
− ∂ E[ProfitF ]
∂wjF
> A(wjFκ
2
j − wiFκ2i ) = AwjFκ2j > 0,
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which means that supplier m would indeed wish to do this. This is a contradiction. So, if wjF > 0
and ξ2j > ξ
2
i then wiF > 0. In other words, the set of information sources that receive attention
from (and have influence on) the competitive fringe are the clearest information sources.
Second Fact. It will be shown that zi = 0 ⇒ ziF = 0. Equivalently, wi = 0 ⇒ wiF = 0. By way
of a contradiction, suppose wi = 0 but wiF > 0 for some i. The fact that both the oligopoly and
the competitive fringe use (potentially different) sets comprising the clearest (lowest ξ2i ) signals
means that N ⊂ NF , and, ordering the signals ξ21 < ξ22 < . . . < ξ2n, if j > i then wj = 0 and for
j < i, wjF > 0. Define an analogous set of quantities to those in (33):
k˜0 =
∑
j∈NF
1
κ2j
, k˜1 =
∑
j∈NF
ξj
κ2j
, and k˜2 =
∑
j∈NF
ξ2j
κ2j
,
and let kˆx = k˜x − kx =
∑
j∈NF \N ξ
x
j /κ
2
j > 0. Choose i so that i = max{j |wjF > 0} = maxj∈NF j.
Now ν is as found in (35). On the other hand, νF /δF , implicitly found in (38) derives from the
first-order condition for the fringe in (36), which applies for all signals receiving positive weight
(those in NF ). Since N ⊂ NF , the manipulations following (36) can be repeated, noting that for
some j, wj = 0, and that k˜x must replace kx everywhere. In particular (38) becomes[
(1 + k˜2)(σ
−2 + k˜0)− k˜21
] νF
δF
=
β
1− β k˜1 + (σ
−2 + k˜0)ν. (40)
Recall the maintained hypothesis is that wi = 0 but wiF > 0 for some i = maxj∈NF j. Take the
first-order condition for the weight the fringe places on i from (36). Then, with wi = 0,
wiF + νF
ξi
κ2i
=
σ2
κ2i
[
δF
β
1− β − (w¯F − δF w¯)
]
.
Substituting for w¯F − δF w¯, which may be calculated analogously to the steps following (36) but
replacing kx with k˜x everywhere,
wiF =
1
κ2i
{
1
σ−2 + k˜0
[
δF
β
1− β + k˜1νF
]
− νF ξi
}
.
For this to be positive, as required, the term within the brackets must be positive, or
wiF > 0 ⇔ 1
σ−2 + k˜0
[
δF
β
1− β + k˜1νF
]
> νF ξi
⇔ β
1− β >
νF
δF
[
ξi(σ
−2 + k˜0)− k˜1
]
⇔
[
(1 + k˜2)(σ
−2 + k˜0)− k˜21
] β
1− β >
[
β
1− β k˜1 + (σ
−2 + k˜0)ν
](
ξi(σ
−2 + k˜0)− k˜1
)
,
where the last line follows from the expression for νF /δF in (40). Now, multiplying out, cancelling
common terms, and dividing through by (σ−2 + k˜0), this means that
wiF > 0 ⇔ (1 + k˜2) β
1− β > ν
[
ξi(σ
−2 + k˜0)− k˜1
]
+ ξik˜1
β
1− β
⇔ β
1− β
[
(1 + k˜2)− ξik˜1
]
> γpi
ξi(σ
−2 + k˜0)− k˜1
pi+k2
k1
(σ−2 + k0)− k1
, (41)
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where the last line follows from the value of ν found in (35). Consider the fraction on the right-
hand side of this last inequality. Note that, using the kˆx notation,
ξi(σ
−2 + k˜0)− k˜1 > pi + k2
k1
(σ−2 + k0)− k1
⇔ ξi(σ−2 + k0 + kˆ0)− (k1 − kˆ1) > pi + k2
k1
(σ−2 + k0)− k1
⇔ ξi(σ−2 + k0) + (ξikˆ0 − kˆ1) > pi + k2
k1
(σ−2 + k0). (42)
Now ξi ≥ ξj for all j ∈ NF , so ξikˆ0 = ξi
∑
j∈NF \N 1/κ
2
j ≥
∑
j∈NF \N ξj/κ
2
j = kˆ1: the second term on
the left-hand side is at least zero. The first term on the left-hand side, however, is strictly larger
than the term on the right-hand side (since i /∈ N , from Proposition 8, ξi > K ≡ (pi+k2)/k1). This
confirms the inequality in (42). Now consider the left-hand side of the inequality in (41). Again,
using the kˆx notation, the second term of the inequality is
1 + k˜2 − ξik˜1 = 1 + k2 + kˆ2 − ξi(k1 + kˆ1) = 1 + (k2 − ξik1) + (kˆ2 − ξikˆ1).
Once again, ξi > (pi + k2)/k1 ⇒ ξik1 − k2 > pi, and ξikˆ1 = ξi
∑
j∈NF \N ξj/κ
2
j ≥
∑
j∈NF \N ξ
2
j /κ
2
j = kˆ2.
This means that 1 + k˜2 − ξik˜1 < 1 − pi. In other words, the left-hand side of (41) is less than
(1− pi)β/(1− β). On the other hand, from the inequality established in (42), the right-hand side
of (41) is greater than γpi. But γpi > (1 − pi)β/(1 − β), as established in (39). The inequality in
(41) fails, yielding a contradiction. So NF ⊆ N .
Given the premise of the second part of the proposition, NF ⊂ N , as required. 
Proof of Proposition 10. Let n = 1 and c = 0. Now, from (29),
F (sm) =
sm(1− (1− β)sm)
β
(
δm
σ2 + κ2 + (1− δmsm)ξ2
)2
. (43)
Take two suppliers, m and m′, and suppose the former is larger: sm > sm′ . Define ς = (1 − β)sm
and ς ′ = (1− β)sm′ , so that ς > ς ′. Also note that 1 > (1− β) ≥ (1− β)(sm + sm′) = ς + ς ′. Define
α =
ξ2
σ2 + κ2 + ξ2
∈ [0, 1].
With this notation in place, (43) becomes
F (sm) =
ς(1− ς)
β(1− β)
(
δm/ξ
2
α−1 − δmsm
)2
=
ς(1− ς)
β(1− β)
(
(1− β)/(2− ς)ξ2
α−1 − ς/(2− ς)
)2
,
since, from (9) with c = 0, δm = (1 − β)β/(β + β(1 − δmsm)) = (1 − β)/(2 − ς) and hence smδm =
ς/(2− ς). Rearranging this expression for F (sm) gives
F (sm) =
(1− β)
β
(
α
ξ2
)2
× ς(1− ς)
(2− (1 + α)ς)2 ,
where the first term does not depend upon sm. Therefore F (sm) > F (sm′), so that the larger
supplier (m) has a greater incentive to acquire new information, if and only if
ς(1− ς)
(2− (1 + α)ς)2 >
ς ′(1− ς ′)
(2− (1 + α)ς ′)2 .
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Multiplying across the (positive) denominators, multiplying out the resultant expressions, and
then simplifying, this inequality will hold if and only if
4(ς − ς ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
× (1− (ς + ς ′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> (1 + α)(3− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
× ςς ′ × (ς ′ − ς)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
.
For c = 0, larger suppliers have a higher incentive to acquire new information. Moreover, the
last expression is strictly negative for sm > sm′ . Thus, by continuity, the result will also hold for
all positive c sufficiently small, as stated in the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 11. Evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium,
E[Industry Profit] =
E[Profitm]
s
=
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)s)
β
]
E[θpm]
− 1− (1− β)s
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)s)
2β
]
E[p2m]
− cE[θ
2]
2
− c(1− β)
2s2
2β2
∑
m′ 6=m
∑
m′′ 6=m
E[pm′pm′′ ]
+
(1− β)s
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)s)
β
] ∑
m′ 6=m
E[pmpm′ ]
− c(1− β)s
β
∑
m′ 6=m
E[θpm′ ].
In terms of variance and covariance terms,
E[Industry Profit] = full-information profit− cσ
2
2
+
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)s)
β
]
cov[θ, pm]
− 1− (1− β)s
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)s)
2β
]
var[pm]
− c(1− β)
2s2
2β2
∑
m′ 6=m
∑
m′′ 6=m
cov[pm′ , pm′′ ]
+
(1− β)s
β
[
1 +
c(1− (1− β)s)
β
] ∑
m′ 6=m
cov[pm, pm′ ]
− c(1− β)s
β
∑
m′ 6=m
cov[θ, pm′ ].
Now set c = 0, so that there are constant returns to scale. In this case,
E[Industry Profit] = full-information profit
+ cov[θ, pm]− 1− (1− β)s
β
var[pm] +
(1− β)s
β
∑
m′ 6=m
cov[pm, pm′ ].
Evaluating at a symmetric strategy profile, so that wim = wi and w¯m = w¯ for all m,
cov[θ, pm] = w¯σ
2, var[pm] = w¯
2σ2 +
n∑
i=1
w2i (κ
2
i + ξ
2
i ) and cov[pm, pm′ ] = w¯
2σ2 +
n∑
i=1
w2i κ
2
i . (44)
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Substituting in these terms and re-arranging appropriately,
E[Industry Profit] = full-information profit
+ (w¯ − w¯2)σ2 − 1
pi†
n∑
i=1
w2i
(
pi†κ2i + ξ
2
i
)
where pi† ≡ β
1− (1− β)s.
Maximization of this and solution of the n linear first-order conditions straightforwardly gener-
ates the claims concerning w†i and w¯
†.
Using the expression from (4), consumer surplus is
∑M
m=1 smCSm where
CSm =
1
2
[
(θ − pm)2 + (1− β)(1− sm)(P−m − pm)(θ − pm)
β
]
.
Hence, evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium
E[CS] = full-information CS +
σ2
2
− cov[θ, pm] + 1
2
(
1 +
(1− β)(1− s)
β
)
var[pm]− (1− β)(1− s)
2β
cov[pm, pm′ ]
Substituting in the variance and covariances from (44),
E[CS] = full-information CS +
σ2
2
− w¯σ2 + w¯
2σ2
2
+
1
2pi†
n∑
i=1
w2i
(
pi†κ2i + ξ
2
i
)
,
and where pi† is the expression used previously. Notice that the terms that depend on relative
information use are opposite in sign and half the size of those that are present within the ex-
pression for industry profit.
Combining (in a symmetric industry, with c = 0) consumer surplus and profit,
E[Welfare] = full-information welfare +
σ2
2
− 1− (1− β)s
2β
var[pm] +
(1− β)(1− s)
2β
cov[pm, pm′ ].
Notice that the covariance of a supplier’s price with the demand shifter (cov[θ, pm]) disappears.
Substituting in for the remaining variance and covariance terms,
E[Welfare] = full-information welfare +
σ2
2
− w¯
2σ2
2
− 1
2pi†
n∑
i=1
w2i
(
pi†κ2i + ξ
2
i
)
.
This is maximized by setting wi = 0 for each i. However, if positive information is used is
considered, so that w¯ > 0, then it is optimal to set wi ∝ 1/(pi†κ2i + ξ2i ), as claimed. 
Proof of Proposition 12. This follows from arguments in the text. Specifically, setting c > 0 influ-
ences only expected industry profit. Note that
E[Industry Profit] = E[Industry Profit | c = 0]
+ c
[
w¯σ2 − σ
2
2
− w¯
2σ2
2
− 1
2pi‡
n∑
i=1
w2i (pi
‡κ2i + ξ
2
i )
]
.
The last term is increasing in wi when evaluated at wi = 0 for each i. 
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APPENDIX B. SUPPLEMENTARY CALCULATIONS
Profit and Consumer Surplus. The expression for the profit of supplier m in (3) is obtained
by substituting in the demand function from (2).
For consumer surplus, note that
Consumer Surplus =
∫ 1
0
(u(q`, Q)− p`q`) d` =
M∑
m=1
(u(qm, Q)− pmqm) .
Next, using (1), substituting in demand and Q = θ − P ,
u(qm, Q)− pmqm = qm
(
θ − βqm + (1− β)Q
2
− pm
)
= qm
(
θ − β(θ − pm) + (1− β)(P − pm) + (1− β)(θ − P )
2
− pm
)
=
qm(θ − pm)
2
=
1
2
(
(θ − pm)2 + (1− β)(P − pm)(θ − pm)
β
)
Payoffs in a Quadratic-Loss Coordination Game. (5) says that maximization of a supplier’s
profit objective is equivalent to minimization of the quadratic-loss function pim(pm− γmθ)2 + (1−
pim)(pm − P−m)2. Equivalently,
Profitm ∝ other terms− p
2
m
2
+ pimγmθpm + (1− pim)pmP−m,
where the “other terms” do not depend on pm. From (6),
γm =
β + c(1− (1− β)sm)
β + (1 + c)(1− (1− β)sm) and pim =
β(β + (1 + c)(1− (1− β)sm))
(1− (1− β)sm)(2β + c(1− (1− β)sm)) .
Hence (following some re-arrangement) the coefficients on θpm and pmP−m are
γmpim =
β(β + c(1− (1− β)sm))
(1− (1− β)sm)(2β + c(1− (1− β)sm)) and
1− pim = (β + c(1− (1− β)sm)) (1− β)(1− sm)
(1− (1− β)sm)(2β + c(1− (1− β)sm))
From the proof of Proposition 1,
Profitm
sm
= other terms +
[
1 +
c[1− (1− β)sm]
β
]
θpm
−
[
1− (1− β)sm
β
+
c[1− (1− β)sm]2
2β2
]
p2m
+
[
c[(1− β)2(1− sm)2 + β(1− β)(1− sm)]
β2
+
(1− β)(1− sm)
β
]
P−mpm,
where as before “other terms” do not involve pm. Re-arranging slightly,
Profitm ∝ other terms +
[
β2 + βc(1− (1− β)sm)
(1− (1− β)sm)(2β + c(1− (1− β)sm))
]
θpm
− p
2
m
2
+
[
(β + c(1− (1− β)sm)) (1− β)(1− sm)
(1− (1− β)sm)(2β + c(1− (1− β)sm))
]
P−mpm.
By inspection the coefficients on the terms p2m, θpm, and P−mpm match those from earlier.
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The quadratic-payoff-coordination representation can also be used to derive the full-information
equilibrium prices reported in Proposition 1. Note that
pm = pimγmθ + (1− pim)P−m = pimγmθ + (1− pim)(P − smpm)
1− sm
⇒ pm = (1− sm)pimγmθ + (1− pim)P
(1− sm) + sm(1− pim) =
1− pim
1− smpim
(
(1− sm)pimγmθ
(1− pim) + P
)
Substituting in for pim, note that
1− pim
1− smpim =
(β + c(1− (1− β)sm)) (1− β)(1− sm)
(1− (1− β)sm)(2β + c(1− (1− β)sm))− βsm(β + (1 + c)(1− (1− β)sm))
=
(1− β) (β + c(1− (1− β)sm))
β + (β + c)(1− (1− β)sm) = δm,
where δm is from (9). It is also straightforward to confirm that
(1− sm)pimγm
(1− pim) =
β
1− β .
This verifies the claim in (9). Taking the weighted sum generates P as claimed.
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